

**FINAL REPORT AND MODEL POLICY
OF THE
POLICE BODY-WORN CAMERA
FEASIBILITY REVIEW COMMITTEE**

January 26, 2021
Madison, Wisconsin

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OVERVIEW¹

The recent nationwide spate of high-visibility police use-of-force incidents, often captured on video, and the ensuing social unrest expressing outrage over systematic race-based excessive use of force by police, have thrust the issue of body-worn cameras (BWCs) to the forefront of public debate. Calls for implementing BWC programs are common, and the data suggest that large numbers of police departments are adopting them. In 2013, the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics estimated that over one-quarter of U.S. police departments had adopted BWCs;² by 2016, about half of U.S. law enforcement agencies (47%) had adopted BWCs.³ Of those agencies that had adopted BWCs, approximately 60% had fully deployed BWCs to all officers, while 40% had adopted only pilot projects or adopted partial deployment for some assignments.⁴ The number of departments with BWCs is almost surely significantly higher today than when this data was collected more than four years ago, especially given that in 2015 the Obama Administration awarded \$23 million in grants to law enforcement agencies across the nation for BWC pilot projects,⁵ although recently some departments have abandoned their use of BWCs, apparently primarily smaller departments that struggle with the costs of footage storage.

In communities without BWCs, including Madison, news accounts of violent encounters between police and community members are often accompanied by pointed observations that police were not equipped with BWCs, or that police in the reporting locale do not wear BWCs. A recent editorial in the Wisconsin State Journal lamented, “We’re not excited about the mayor spending \$450,000 on an independent police monitor because it won’t have video evidence to inform its decisions about controversial police encounters.”⁶

Reflecting the urgency with which Madison city leaders perceive this issue, in the summer of 2020 the Common Council and the Mayor created this Committee, the Body-Worn Camera Feasibility Review Committee, and gave it a six-month deadline within which to complete its work. Three months before that deadline, while the Committee was still studying the matter, the Common Council moved forward and allocated funds for a potential police BWC

¹ The Committee is grateful to the following City staff members for their time and contributions on this project: Common Council Legislative Analyst Karen Kapusta-Pofahl, City Attorney Mike Haas, and MPD Captain Brian Austin.

² U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, LAW ENFORCEMENT MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE STATISTICS, 2013, 200 (2015).

³ U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, LAW ENFORCEMENT MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE STATISTICS BODY-WORN CAMERA SUPPLEMENT 2016, at 16 (2016) (question 10a).

⁴ *Id.* at 25.

⁵ U.S. Dep’t of Justice, *Justice Department Awards over \$23 Million in Funding for Body Worn Camera Pilot Program to Support Law Enforcement Agencies in 32 States* (Sept. 21, 2015), <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-awards-over-23-million-funding-body-worn-camera-pilot-program-support-law>.

⁶ Editorial, *Good to see solid funding for city police*, WISCONSIN STATE JOURNAL, Oct. 25, 2020, p. B3.

pilot project, though expenditure of the funds would be contingent on a separate second Council vote approving the expenditure during 2021.

Advocates of BWCs tout their potential to create an objective factual record of disputed events; increase police transparency and accountability; reduce imbalances of power in police-said, suspect-said credibility contests; enhance public views of police legitimacy; reduce police use-of-force incidents; reduce unfounded civilian complaints against police; improve police and civilian behavior during encounters; streamline the complaint-resolution process; provide improved evidence for criminal prosecutions of criminal offenders; and provide improved opportunities for police training. For these purposes, across the spectrum, BWCs enjoy wide popular support. Polls consistently find that, nationwide, nearly 90% of the public supports BWCs.⁷

Support for BWCs is far from universal, however. Critics of BWCs point to the scientific literature researching BWCs (which indicates that in reality, BWCs have little impact on either police or civilian behavior), the expansions of surveillance and intrusions upon privacy, the financial cost of BWCs and data storage, and data suggesting that BWCs expand criminalization of marginalized populations. The public support they enjoy thus masks challenges to and unintended consequences of BWCs that make the decision whether to implement a BWC program, and if so, how, much more complicated than they first appear. Various segments of Madison, especially among some marginalized communities, are strongly opposed to BWC implementation, citing a variety of costs and detrimental effects. Our Committee worked hard to understand all of these potential benefits and potential harms. The picture that emerged is a complicated one.

Reflecting that complexity, this Committee's work follows the work of a predecessor Committee that in 2015 voted against adopting BWCs in Madison. As a starting point, our Committee heard presentations from individuals who participated in that earlier committee work. To start, we heard a presentation from Jacquelyn Boggess, who conducted extensive listening sessions and focus groups among affected people in the community for that prior committee. Ms. Boggess reported that members of Madison's Black and other marginalized communities at that time expressed no strong feelings either for or against BWCs; they were more concerned about mistrust, fear, and frustration with racial profiling and discrimination by police. While they had no strong feelings about BWCs themselves, they had some concerns about the potential for officer manipulation of camera data, cameras providing a false sense of security, and privacy

⁷ Frankovic, K. (2015). *Unlike Ferguson, the shooting of Walter Scott finds racial agreement*, YouGov (April 15, 2015), <https://today.yougov.com/topics/politics/articles-reports/2015/04/15/unlike-ferguson-shooting-walter-scott-finds-racial> (2015 poll finds 88% of the public supports BWCs, and only 8% oppose them); *Large Majorities Favor Police Reforms in Congressional Bills, New UMD Survey Finds*, <https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/large-majorities-favor-police-reforms-in-congressional-bills-new-umd-survey-finds-301093289.html> (2020 poll finds that 89% of respondents favor BWCs); Khan, C. *Exclusive: Most Americans, including Republicans, support sweeping Democratic police reform proposals - Reuters/Ipsos poll* (June 11, 2020), <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-minneapolis-police-poll-exclusive/exclusive-most-americans-including-republicans-support-sweeping-democratic-police-reform-proposals-reuters-ipsos-poll-idUSKBN23I380> (2020 Reuters poll finds that 92% of respondents want federal police to wear BWCs).

issues. Our current Committee has sought to address those serious and legitimate concerns in this Report and its accompanying Model Policy.

Two members of the predecessor BWC Committee—Tom Brown and Veronica Figueroa—are members of our current Committee, and they also addressed our Committee on the prior Committee’s work and conclusion. Tom Brown (who co-chairs the current Committee) expressed strong support for BWCs at this time, noting, “It is a different era, it is a different time.” He added “I believe that if we do get body cameras, I do think that it will help us in the effort of the police serving us, especially those marginalized communities. I think it will help bring more honor. And I also think ... some people will feel protected, even the cops that fear that they might be accused of doing wrong.”

For her part, Veronica Figueroa, who voted against BWCs in the prior Committee, explained: “My vote no was mainly because we didn’t have a process in place. We didn’t have policies and procedures to give the committee straight answers on how these cameras were going to be used, who was going to have access to the camera, whether or not they were going to be able to be turned on or off, when especially in domestic violence situations or when victims were sexually assaulted, how the cameras were going to be [considered] if people were undocumented, consider certain aspects of people’s lives. So my no was related more to like I cannot approve something that doesn’t have a policy and procedure behind it that is potentially going to hinder more the community than help in the community. My other logic was also there’s tons of cameras watching what we all do through phones, and there’s videos and tons of footage out there with no accountability. So is this camera really going to hold police accountable for misbehavior, or even citizens for misbehavior, when we have tons of footage and nothing has happened both from police and from every day regular citizens that just, you know, bystanders who just go and record what’s happening. So those were my two things that I looked at when I decided to say no to body cameras....” In our current Committee’s work, we have taken efforts to address both of these critical issues in this Report and the Model Policy.

The Committee also heard from numerous community groups and individuals, who shared varying perspectives on BWCs.⁸ In addition to presentations from representatives of eighteen organizations, the Committee extended invitations to present to an additional fourteen community organizations.⁹ The Committee reached out to this wide array of organizations and individuals in order to hear from a wide swathe of Madison’s community, despite the limited

⁸ Presenters included Jacqueline Boggess, UW-Madison School of Social Work; Dr. Ruben Anthony, the Urban League; Chris Ott, ACLU of Wisconsin; Captain Brian Austin, Madison Police Department; Dr. Floyd Rose, 100 Black Men; Greg Jones & Pia Kinney James, NAACP of Dane County; M. Adams, Kabjuag Vaj, & Mahnker Dahnweth, Freedom, Inc.; the Hon. Everett Mitchell, Dane County Circuit Court; Mike Gennaco, the OIR Group; Greg Markle, Operation Fresh Start; Madison City Attorney Mike Haas; Peter Block, Nick DiSiato, and Doug Work, Milwaukee Police Department; Tom Dull, Madison Police IT Department; Anna Moffit, National Alliance for Mental Illness (NAMI) Dane County; Kelli Thompson and Adam Plotkin, Wisconsin State Public Defender’s Office; Ismael Ozanne, Dane County District Attorney’s Office; Lt. Edward Hartwick, Fitchburg Police Department; and Harlan Yu, Executive Director of Upturn.

⁹ Occupy Madison, MOSES, GSAFE, Latino Academy, JustDane, Movement Fund, Nehemiah, Peace Network, Sankofa, Urban Triage, Anesis Therapy, Latino Chamber of Commerce, and UNIDOS.

timeframe within which to complete its work and the particularly busy and challenging time for many organizations in Madison during the COVID-19 pandemic. None were selected for invitation because of their position on BWCs; indeed, the Committee had no knowledge of most of the organizations' positions on BWCs when they were invited. Whether directly invited or not, representatives of all community groups and all individuals were welcome to participate in the Committee's meetings and make comments or suggest other organizations to invite.

Of those that presented to our Committee, two organizations, Freedom, Inc. (a Madison-based "Black and Southeast Asian non-profit organization that works with low- to no-income communities of color"), and Upturn (a national organization that "advances equity and justice in the design, governance, and use of technology"), as well as a number of individuals who addressed our Committee, expressed firm opposition to providing police with another tool that they fear will just be used to further monitor and oppress communities of color and exacerbate problems of over-prosecution and criminalization.

Most groups the committee heard from, however, including national and local civil liberties groups, groups representing minorities and vulnerable or over-policed populations, police, and both prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys, expressed varying degrees of support or in a few cases, no clear position. The Committee does not claim to have heard from a statistically representative set of community organizations. A number of additional groups were invited, but were unable to participate for various reasons, including a number of organizations that are known to have strong opposition to BWCs.

Representatives of the Urban League, 100 Black Men, the NAACP of Dane County, Operation Fresh Start, and the ACLU of Wisconsin, for example, offered varying degrees of support for BWCs. Dr. Floyd Rose of 100 Black Men told the Committee that BWCs could be part of the solution to policing problems in Madison, but that adopting BWCs should not be done in the absence of making bigger fixes. Chris Ott of the ACLU of Wisconsin said that, while the ACLU usually opposes governmental surveillance tools, the ACLU supports carefully regulated BWC programs because of the potential they create for police accountability and transparency. Greg Jones and Pia Kinney James of the NAACP likewise told the Committee that BWCs can be useful tools for ensuring transparency, but that they must be adopted with carefully drafted policies to govern their use. Jones concluded that, without BWCs, all we have is the account of an incident provided by police, so "[i]f we don't have a tool like this, we lose this battle." Judge Everett Mitchell similarly stressed the importance of BWCs for creating a record that can be used to contest police-officer accounts of incidents. Without video evidence, all the Court typically has to rely on is the competing accounts of police officers and suspects and, as he put it, "[o]fficers don't need bodycams to get people convicted." Greg Markle of Operation Fresh Start reported on a survey of his agency's clients, 16-24-year-old youths, predominantly of color, who have struggled to stay connected to successful pathways in life. His survey found that, among these youths, an overwhelming majority of whom distrust police and have negative views of them, a solid majority said they would favor implementation of BWCs and that they would trust police more if they wore them. These youths also said they would be more likely to call police in a dangerous situation if police wore BWCs.

Still others took no firm position on whether to adopt BWCs, focusing instead on the need for careful regulation of any BWC program. The National Alliance for Mental Illness (NAMI), for example, has taken no formal position on BWCs, but strongly believes that, if BWCs are adopted, they must be governed by carefully crafted policies. Anna Moffitt of NAMI Dane County told the Committee that BWCs increase transparency and accountability for law enforcement in their encounters with the mentally ill, but also have a down side—they can capture video of a person in mental health crisis and thereby create a harmful record that follows the individual for life.

Criminal justice system actors were uniformly supportive of BWCs as a useful tool for developing evidence to help get to the truth. As noted, Dane County Circuit Court Judge Everett Mitchell urged adoption of BWCs as a tool for resolving disputes between police and civilians about the facts of an encounter. Representatives of police agencies—from Madison, Milwaukee, and Fitchburg—expressed strong support for BWCs. Milwaukee and Fitchburg Police also helped the Committee understand the benefits and challenges of actually implementing BWCs, based on their own recent experiences implementing the technology. And both the Public Defender’s Office and the District Attorney’s Office expressed strong support for BWCs as an evidence-gathering and preserving tool.

As this brief summary of presentations made to the Committee suggests, for most of those in the community who support BWCs, that support came with caveats. Repeatedly, the Committee heard that no one should expect BWCs to be a panacea. And the Committee repeatedly heard concerns, even from BWC supporters, that BWCs can be misused, and can have unintended negative consequences. A report submitted by the National Alliance for Mental Illness (NAMI), exemplifies the mixed reactions to BWCs: “[BWC] use is beneficial in terms of transparency and accountability by police. Their use is problematic in terms of personal privacy.”

Because so many of the questions about the uses and effects of BWCs are ones that in theory can be answered by research, the Committee spent considerable time and effort examining the social science research on BWCs. The research, however, has not yet fully resolved some important questions and is not uniform in its results, although for most questions the research has provided substantial quantitative understanding of the impact – or lack of impact – of BWCs. In sum, it is fair to say that the scientific research on BWCs paints a “modest and mixed” picture of the effects of BWCs.¹⁰ A comprehensive, systematic review of the social science research on BWCs published in 2020 summarizes the research, concluding, “There is high variability in findings across studies, which suggests that BWCs can have positive, negative, or null impacts on police or citizen behaviors under different circumstances that are not well understood.”¹¹ The researchers go on to elaborate:

¹⁰ Lum, C., Stoltz, M., Koper, C., & Scherer, J.A. (2019). Research on body-worn cameras: What we know, what we need to know. *Criminology & Public Policy*, 18:93-113, 111.

¹¹ Lum, C., Koper, C.S., Wison, D.B., Stoltz, M., Goodier, M., Eggins, E., Higginson, A., & Mazerolle, L. (2020). Body-worn cameras’ effects on police officers and citizen behavior: A systematic review. Source. *Campbell Systematic Review*, p. 3.

Our meta-analysis of 30 studies and 116 effects of police use of BWCs finds that this technology produces few clear or consistent impacts on police or citizen behaviors. Across a variety of outcome measures—including police use of force, complaints against officers, arrests, proactive police activities, assaults or resistance against officers, citizen calls for police service, and others—individual studies have produced a mix of positive, negative, and null findings. The average impact of BWCs on all of these outcomes but one is not statistically significant across studies. The one exception is with complaints—BWCs do seem to reduce complaints against police. The average relative reduction in complaints linked to BWCs is about 17% (and may be greater in agencies that have recent histories of more serious officer misconduct). It is unclear, however, to what extent this represents improvements in the behaviors of officers and citizens toward one another (and hence more positive interactions) or a decline in the willingness of citizens to file complaints against officers.¹²

Additionally, the estimated effects of BWCs are quite variable (i.e., statistically heterogeneous) across studies, meaning that BWCs may increase these behaviors in some contexts and decrease them in others with considerable uncertainty about any typical effect across implementations. Our analysis examined several factors that may contribute to this variability, including whether randomized designs were used; the unit of assignment; susceptibility to contamination of treatment and control conditions; study fidelity; the level of discretion allowed by an agency's BWC policy; and an agency's recent history with reform initiatives or sentinel events. None of these factors were sufficient to explain the variability in BWC results, though there are tentative (albeit inconclusive) indications that BWCs are more effective in reducing police use of force (broadly defined) when agencies limit officer discretion in the use of the cameras. Further research is needed to better understand how these contextual factors and others—alone and in combination—influence the outcomes that police experience with BWCs, for better or worse.¹³

To complicate matters even further, because so much of the research is highly dependent on the local culture and the practices and policies governing the use of BWCs, it is hard to know how much the research will translate directly to the experience in Madison, or whether better (or worse) outcomes can be expected here given the culture and policies that exist or might be created here.

Regardless, from all of this, two clear conclusions emerge:

1. BWCs are not a panacea, and cannot alone be expected to “fix,” or necessarily even improve, the perceived problems with policing and police/community relations, over-policing, or excessive uses of force. Indeed, it is possible that they might cause more unintended negative consequence than benefits. They should be understood instead as a tool—a tool that can expand the collection of evidence. That evidence can then be used in beneficial or problematic ways. The positive or negative impact of a BWC program therefore depends more on the procedures and context under which they are deployed, and the uses that are made of them, than on the mere

¹² *Id.*, p. 30.

¹³ *Id.*, pp. 30-31.

deployment of the cameras themselves.

2. Relatedly, to realize any of the desired effects from BWCs, and to minimize the potential magnitudes and risks of harmful effects from BWCs, if BWCs are to be implemented the implementation must be only as a part of a package of reforms designed to enhance accountability, improve community relations, improve outcomes, and ensure BWCs are utilized appropriately and in ways that minimize their potential for unintended harms. In Madison, if the City follows through with the 177 recommendations made in the 2019 Report of the Madison Police Department Police and Procedure Review Ad Hoc Committee, and continues to move forward with the process of civilian engagement with police in goal-setting, policy-making, and incident review, the City will be making meaningful progress toward meeting the first of these requirements. What remains is to ensure that any BWC program the City might adopt is one that tightly regulates the use of BWCs and ensures compliance with best practices, as informed by the social science research and the experiences with BWCs in other cities, and that conditions outside the BWC program itself be set as to, as far as possible, reduce harms.

In this Report, we identify the complexities of BWC policy, and we outline what a good BWC policy should entail. We stress that proper implementation of BWCs can be seen as an important part of an overall package of reforms designed to reimagine the role of police—from enforcers solely aligned with prosecuting individuals or undesirable behaviors, to justice system partners aligned with a search for the truth on behalf of prosecutors to be sure, but also on behalf of criminal defendants, and the whole community. In sum, BWCs can best be implemented if adopted as part of a reform of policing that positions police as partners of the whole justice system and the whole community, not just enforcers of the law against the community or an arm of the prosecutor.

To aid the Committee in considering both whether to recommend a BWC program in Madison, and what that program should look like if the City moves forward with one, the Committee found it helpful to identify the potential pros and cons of a BWC program, and then to evaluate those pros and cons in light of existing research and experience. As the following analysis reveals, the two key questions confronting the Committee – 1) whether to recommend the use of BWCs, and 2) what policies and other reforms to adopt to minimize their harms – are connected. Whether the Committee recommends that Madison should adopt BWCs depends heavily on what policies and procedures are adopted and implemented to guide BWC use, and what other reforms are implemented to enhance their utility and improve police/community relations.

While the Committee struggled to come to consensus on whether to recommend for or against BWCs, the Committee was unanimous that BWCs should *only* be implemented if done so in a context that includes good policies and procedures as part of an overall package of reforms that enhances the potential for desired effects and minimizes the potential for unintended harms as much as possible. Thus, the following should be strict preconditions for implementation of BWCs.

Madison should adopt a BWC program only if:

1. MPD has formally adopted the BWC policies recommended by the Body-Worn Camera Feasibility Review Committee with, at most, minor modifications that do not alter the essential substance and principles outlined in this Report and in the Model Policy, which are designed to minimize officer discretion, minimize potential bias in the captured images, protect legitimate privacy interests, minimize opportunities for exacerbating racial disparities and increased criminalization of marginalized groups, minimize opportunities for mass surveillance of civilians, ensure the integrity of the recordings, enhance accountability and transparency, and enhance access to the truth.
2. Accompanying all disclosure or release of BWC footage shall be a statement, either written as a document or added to the beginning of the video, informing viewers of the perceptual bias (detailed below) inherent in viewing BWC video footage, with an instruction to the viewer to consider this risk and its impact before reaching a conclusion about the footage, in order to arrive at valid judgements.^[1] This instruction may include:
 - a. Because the BWC is not aimed at the wearer, it may not capture relevant actions of the wearer. BWC footage may not accurately capture the intent and possible misconduct of the person wearing the BWC, since they are largely invisible in their own BWC video. Research shows that human beings tend to judge more harshly the person who is the subject in a video and therefore to skew perception in favor of the wearer and against the subject because BWCs are pointed at the subject.
 - b. BWC footage may promote or create an exaggerated perception of aggression of subjects interacting with the BWC wearer, given motion and jostling of the BWC on the wearer.
 - c. BWC footage may promote or create an exaggerated perception of the height and size of subjects interacting with the BWC wearer, dependent on the position of the BWC mount.
 - d. The speed at which BWC footage is viewed may affect perception of subject intent or actions. Slowing down footage may make the subject appear more deliberate in their actions, while speeding up footage may make the subject appear more aggressive.
 - e. BWC footage provides a record of events, but that record is not comprehensive and is subject to the viewer's interpretation. BWC footage should be considered within the context of other evidence provided.
3. Given ongoing advances in research, experts on cognitive and perceptual biases should periodically be consulted for recommendations on steps that should be taken

^[1] Elek, J. K., Ware, L. J., & Ratcliff, J. J. (2012). Knowing when the camera lies: Judicial instructions mitigate the camera perspective bias. *Legal and Criminological Psychology*, 17(1), 123-135.

to best mitigate these biases in judgements based on body camera footage (e.g., specific trainings for prosecutors, etc.), and appropriate actions should be taken, based on these recommendations.

4. The Independent Police Monitor and Police Civilian Oversight Board are fully operational and have access to BWC video footage as set forth elsewhere in this report and model policy.
5. The City and MPD have made substantial and sustained progress toward adopting the other reforms recommended by the previous Madison Police Department Policy and Procedure Review Ad Hoc Committee, especially in the areas of Accountability, Use of Force, and Response to Critical Incidents.
6. A system and or process for sharing BWC video footage files – preferably an electronic file sharing system if feasible – with the Dane County District Attorney’s Office and the Public Defender’s Office in time for informing charging decisions for cases referred by MPD for potential criminal charges.
7. The Dane County District Attorney’s Office has formally enacted a policy to review any relevant BWC video before making a charging decision in any case referred by MPD where BWC video is available.
8. The Dane County District Attorney’s Office has firmly committed to measures sufficient to prevent an overall increase in charging rates and criminalization in low-level offenses caused by MPD BWC implementation.¹⁴
9. Arrangements have been made for a rigorous, randomized controlled trial as a pilot program, with tracking and analysis of data on key outcomes, and particularly prosecutorial charging rates. A primary use of the trial would be to determine if charging rates and pleading rates are increased, particularly for misdemeanors, for cases in which BWC video is available. If there is statistically significant evidence of an increase in charging rates, particularly for misdemeanors, which can be causally connected to the implementation of BWCs, measures sufficient to fully offset the increase should be taken before BWC program continuation or more widespread BWC implementation. If expansion of implementation occurs after the pilot program, MPD, as well as the Dane County District Attorney’s Office, should continue to collect data on the effects of BWCs to continue to ascertain if BWCs are producing increases in charging rates for low-level offenses or other unintended negative consequences. If so, the City should take the necessary steps vis-à-vis the MPD and/or the District Attorney’s Office to fully offset any unintended negative consequences.

¹⁴ These may include using more stringent criteria to initiate prosecutions, enacting a default of not prosecuting many types of misdemeanors, and greatly expanding diversion programs.

10. The Common Council should engage in informed deliberation on whether resources required for BWC implementation would best be allocated to BWC implementation or other competing needs.

If the City, MPD, and the DA's Office fail to fulfill these preconditions, then the Committee unanimously agrees that BWCs should not be implemented in Madison.

ANALYZING THE “PROS”: THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF BWCs

- **Increased transparency in law enforcement**

One of the most frequently cited reasons for employing BWCs is that they have the potential to increase transparency—the cameras make a record of police/civilian encounters that might otherwise be unavailable or hidden. Proponents of BWCs believe that residents are more comfortable with enhanced visibility into police work. Indeed, increased transparency is one of the central calls for police reform in Madison, and there is no doubt that video recordings can make police and civilian behavior more observable.

But, whether BWCs will actually translate into greater transparency in practice depends to a great deal on how they are used and controlled, and how footage is accessed. What is clear to the Committee is that, if BWCs are going to increase transparency, they can only do so if employed in ways that minimize officer discretion about when to turn cameras on and off (so that officers cannot choose not to record during incidents in which they might engage in inappropriate behavior); that ensures as many perspectives and the widest view of the incident as possible to minimize the potential for officers to provide misleading accompanying verbal narratives, control where the camera is pointed to distort understanding, or record staged scenes as with planted evidence, etc.; that ensure adequate storage and protection of the integrity of the footage (to ensure the footage is not deleted or altered); and that ensure adequate access by the public. Importantly, given that Madison has now created a new Office of an Independent Monitor (IM) and Civilian Oversight Board (COB), largely unfettered and prompt access to footage by those entities (as well as to the general public, though with additional privacy protections) is essential. At the same time, the existence of the IM and COB at least increases the possibility that BWCs can be employed in Madison in ways that optimize the potential for transparency. Complicating matters, transparency interests inherently conflict with privacy interests, as widespread public availability of BWC footage has the potential to infringe legitimate privacy interests of civilians and in some cases police officers. The Committee has tried to accommodate all of these competing interests and considerations in the Model Policy attached to this report, which we consider an essential component of our recommendations.

As discussed below, other considerations also affect the degree to which BWCs effectively and fairly enhance transparency. Those factors include, for example, the reality that BWCs can provide a biased view of incidents, which might skew perceptions of police/civilian encounters, but do so in ways that might appear unbiased. Relative to dashcam footage, BWC footage may lead to underestimation of officer culpability (by limited context that doesn't fully capture officer intent, since an officer is not the focal subject of their own video) and an exaggerated perception

of the size and physical aggression of individuals interacting with officers. Thus, although BWCs do provide additional information about incidents, some kinds of information captured will be objectively reliable while other kinds are susceptible to misinterpretation. All of these considerations discussed in this section on transparency are also addressed in the model policy that the Committee has proposed.

These considerations are supported by social science research. Recently, a trial in one jurisdiction has suggested that BWCs may produce enhanced transparency (and accountability) by improving police reporting of stops and frisks of civilians, and enhancing the ability of independent monitors to evaluate the legality of the stops. While the finding achieved statistical significance, it did so only weakly, and no firm conclusion should be drawn as to whether this effect is meaningful and generalizable without confirmation in additional trials. Stop & frisk has become a controversial matter in policing given that routine stop & frisk activity poses a serious intrusion on individual liberties and dignity, and has been employed across the country in racially discriminatory ways. In combination, these features of expansive use of stop & frisk activities have added to the corrosion of police/community relations. A report released by the federal monitor of the New York Police Department in December 2020 showed that Officers who wore BWCs reported 39 percent more stops than officers who did not, “suggesting that body cameras could compel officers to provide a more accurate accounting of their pedestrian stops.”¹⁵ Importantly, the Monitor’s Report also found that BWC footage resulted in a statistically significant increase in findings of improper or unlawful stops by police officers—suggesting that the cameras were indeed enhancing transparency and accountability. The Monitor’s Report explained: “In analyzing the stops of officers in the treatment [i.e., officers with BWCs] and control [i.e., officers without BWCs] precincts, the monitor team found that stop reports of officers in the BWC precincts were less likely to be deemed lawful. In stop reports that involved a frisk and/or search, the justifications reported for frisking or searching citizens in BWC officer stop reports were also less likely to be judged by the monitor team as constitutional when compared to control officer reports.”¹⁶ The *New York Times* reported that the federal monitor “attributed the increase in documented stops to officers being more inclined to record their actions on official paperwork knowing that they were recorded and could be reviewed. Underreporting has hindered court-ordered reform efforts for years, but the report suggests that the cameras are key to understanding the scope of the problem and fixing it.”¹⁷

- **Increased trust in law enforcement**

One goal of BWCs is to increase community trust in police. The hope is that civilians might trust police more, knowing that a record is being made of their encounters and that police

¹⁵ Ashley Southall, *Police Body Cameras Cited as ‘Powerful Tool’ Against Stop-and-Frisk Abuses*, NY TIMES, Nov. 30, 2020.

¹⁶ Letter from Peter L. Zimroth to Hon. Analisa Torres (Nov. 30, 2020), transmitting PETER L. ZIMROTH, A CLUSTER RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED TRIAL MEASURING EFFECTS ON THE CIVILITY OF POLICE-CITIZEN ENCOUNTERS, POLICING ACTIVITIES, POLICE LAWFULNESS, AND POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATIONS (Nov. 30, 2020)

¹⁷ *Id.*

are being held accountable for their actions. However, some research to-date shows that has not happened. One recent paper presenting a systematic review of BWC research, for example, reported no links between deployment of body cameras and citizens' views of police legitimacy, professionalism or satisfaction with police interactions.¹⁸ Further, the authors concluded, "There are disparities between the legitimacy afforded to the police by various groups, which does not seem to be remedied by BWCs."¹⁹ In another study, after conducting a randomized-controlled trial of BWCs in one Texas jurisdiction, the Police Executive Research Forum "found no significant differences between perceptions of police officers among citizens who interacted with officers wearing BWCs and citizens who interacted with officers who were not wearing BWCs."²⁰ The study's authors cautioned, however, that the study's "findings may only be generalizable to other agencies with a strong baseline community support. If so, then agencies already seen positively among large majorities of citizens may not see any additional boost to perceptions of legitimacy, professionalism, and satisfaction."²¹ As the study noted, the local police department that was studied enjoyed high levels of community trust, and hence the authors could "not rule out a potential positive effect of BWCs if this work were replicated in a jurisdiction without such strong baseline trust in the police."²²

As noted, an informal survey by Greg Markle of Operation Fresh Start provides some support for the belief that bodycams might increase trust. Markle reported on a survey of his agency's clients, 16-24-year-old at-risk youths, predominantly of color, which found that a solid majority said they would trust police more if police wore BWCs, and that they would be more likely to call police in a dangerous situation if police wore BWCs. On the other hand, there may be an important difference between anticipated benefits (what people imagine deployment of bodycams might bring) versus realized benefits (i.e., people's actual assessments after experience with officers wearing BWCs).

Given the general tenor of media reporting, the growing ubiquity of video cameras in most areas of life, and community expressions of support for BWCs, some members of the Committee expressed concern that, even if adopting BWCs does not increase community trust in police, *failure* to adopt them might further erode trust, as it might raise suspicions that police are unwilling to expose their actions to video recording. At the time the report was written, many of the police departments surrounding Madison equip their officers with BWCs, leaving Madison as an outlier in the area. The adoption of BWCs in these departments may increase the criticism of a lack of transparency and accountability the MPD could face if BWCs are not adopted.

¹⁸ Lum, C., Stoltz, M., Koper, C., & Scherer, J.A. (2019). Research on body-worn cameras: What we know, what we need to know. *Criminology & Public Policy*, 18:93-118.

¹⁹ *Id.*, p. 107

²⁰ Police Executive Research Forum (2017). Final Report: Citizen Perceptions of Body-Worn Cameras: A Randomized Controlled Trial, p. 7. Retrieved from <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwjY9pHGgpruAhUMOs0KHWJuBssQFjABegQIBRAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fperf.memberclicks.net%2Fassets%2Fbodyworncameraperceptions.pdf&usg=AOvVaw2GhM7nFEuXfOcsyfdDJDTb>

²¹ *Id.*, pp. 7-8.

²² *Id.*, p. 6.

On the other hand, the Committee noted concern that any increased trust in police that might accrue from adopting BWCs might erode over time, especially if the footage is not handled in objective and transparent ways, and if other reforms are not adopted at the same time to address root causes of distrust. Moreover, the Committee is sensitive to the sentiment expressed by Freedom, Inc., Upturn, and a number of individuals who addressed our Committee, that BWCs might *diminish* trust, especially among those groups already most suspicious of police, who might view the cameras as just another tool for monitoring and controlling marginalized groups. As with all other considerations, if BWCs are implemented in Madison, real sensitivity and care will have to be paid to this concern.

It is important to recognize that healing and trust are built over time, and BWCs are unlikely to immediately increase public trust significantly in the MPD, even with policies to enhance transparency. Trust and healing will be a process that the MPD and public must work together to build, and BWCs will not replace the need for that effort. In the recommended Model Policy, the Committee has built in rules to try to minimize the degree that BWCs can be misused for monitoring and controlling marginalized groups and to enhance the likelihood of BWCs to improve trust.

- **Increased accountability for police misconduct**

The additional evidence provided by BWCs may help ensure that police who violate the law or abuse their authority will be held accountable. Despite the inherent limitations of BWCs, they can increase the quantity and quality of evidence available for accountability purposes. On this issue, however, a 2020 systematic review of the research by Cynthia Lum and her colleagues concluded, “Research has not directly addressed whether BWCs can strengthen police accountability systems or police-citizen relationships.”²³ Whether they will have the potential for greater accountability will depend on how they are implemented.

One special consideration deserves highlighting here that makes the implementation of a BWC program in Madison different, and potentially more promising, than implementation in many other jurisdictions. If BWCs are adopted here, they will not be the only new tool for increasing accountability. The City’s new Independent Monitor (IM) and Civilian Oversight Board (COB) are, in certain ways, uniquely expansive accountability entities, which will make real and meaningful accountability more likely. The two entities now have the authority to monitor police department policies, practices, and training, and to conduct parallel investigations into allegations of police misconduct. The IM and COB authority over disciplinary matters is limited. Unlike some police oversight entities, the IM and COB can only make recommendations and have no power to impose discipline. The ultimate power to determine whether misconduct occurred and impose discipline lies entirely in the hands of the Chief and Police & Fire Commission, which of course will also have access to the BWC footage. However, the IM and COB will have extensive investigative authority and were adopted by the City with the belief

²³ Lum, C., Koper, C.S., Wilson, D.B., Stoltz, M., Goodier, M., Eggins, E., Higginson, A., & Mazerolle, L. (2020). Body-worn cameras’ effects on police officers and citizen behavior: A systematic review. Source. Campbell Systematic Review, p. 1.

that their findings will have significant persuasive value. If the IM determines that a complaint against a police officer has arguable merit, the IM has the authority to appoint counsel for the aggrieved individual for purposes of filing and litigating a complaint before the Police & Fire Commission. No other civilian oversight entity we are aware of in the country has this authority to appoint counsel for members of the community.

The existence of the IM and COB not only increases the likelihood of meaningful oversight and accountability, but also provides an argument for adopting BWCs in Madison to facilitate that work. To be effective in their monitoring and accountability roles, it will be important for the IM and the COB to have access to the best possible investigative tools and evidence. BWCs can be a very powerful tool for these entities in fulfilling those oversight and accountability responsibilities. Mike Gennaco of the OIR Group told the Committee that he favors BWCs in the right circumstances precisely because of their potential to aid in civilian oversight. He said:

I have seen it to be tremendously advantageous to my work [as a police monitor], because I no longer have to rely entirely on police reports and then compare that to what the civilian says occurred and try to break that tie based on credibility or whatever. Oftentimes it is a he-said/he-said. And with the body camera footage you can—you have a vivid imagery of what transpired. And really, interestingly enough and ironically enough, this happens more frequently on the routine contact than it does on a shooting. Because in a serious deadly force incident or a serious force incident, more often than not there's a tussle, there's physicality, the body camera becomes dislodged, the firing of the weapon gets in the way of the vantage point of the body camera, so you wind up with not a whole lot of helpful information. But in the routine conduct, when an officer comes up to a civilian, and the civilian at the end of that contact believes that the officer did not behave professionally in one way or another, the body camera will tell you what happened. Because there's no obstruction, there's no physicality, it's all there. And you can use that information once you have it to persuasively get a department to take remedial action if remedial action is called for in those kinds of cases. Because you can just point out the body camera, you know, if somebody says to somebody something demeaning or inappropriate, it's captured on tape and now you can then use it effectively to impose remedial action based on that information. So, ... absolutely it has been indispensable to our work, it's a lot more work, but it has been indispensable. And under the right system of accountability, it will increase officer accountability, officer remediation, retraining, and alert a department that's interested in looking at it, warning signs about officers who are not performing consistent with the expectations of the department.

Similarly, the *New York Times* recently reported that, in New York, “[t]he Civilian Complaint Review Board, which investigates accusations of police misconduct filed by civilians, has said that body-camera footage increases the likelihood that its investigators will be able to complete their investigations and substantiate claims against officers.”²⁴ However, one challenge could be access to the records. For instance, the Civilian Complaint Review Board has

²⁴ Ashley Southall, *Police Body Cameras Cited as ‘Powerful Tool’ Against Stop-and-Frisk Abuses*, NY TIMES, Nov. 30, 2020.

complained strongly about NYPD obstructing access to BWC footage.²⁵ As a ProPublica article noted, “The NYPD has regularly failed to turn over key records and videos to police abuse investigators at New York’s Civilian Complaint Review Board.”²⁶ The Civilian Complaint Review Board also noted that NYPD was training officers to signal other officers as a warning that body cameras are active “in an effort to obfuscate or facilitate police misconduct.”²⁷ The Committee recommends that any BWC program include unfettered access to BWC footage by the Independent Police Monitor and Civilian Oversight Board so that the problems experienced in New York are not experienced here. Should those problems arise here, continued use of BWCs should be reexamined.

To many members of this Committee, the fact that Madison has committed itself to an expansive civilian oversight process is the strongest argument for adopting BWCs: having created an oversight mechanism, the City needs to equip the IM and COB with all the tools reasonably available to do the oversight job well.

Even with a dedicated and committed civilian oversight mechanism, however, BWC footage is not guaranteed to enhance accountability, and could in some categories of cases undermine it. Research suggests that BWC footage can create biased perceptions that might interfere with accountability aims and this is most likely to occur in cases when there is physical engagement between the officer and the subject. One study shows, for example, that people are less likely to indict an officer for misconduct (specifically instances of assault, battery, or aggravated battery by an officer) upon watching BWC video than after watching dashcam video or reading a written police report about the same incident.²⁸ If presented with a written report plus BWC video, people are less likely to indict than if given the written report alone. It appears that this effect predominantly occurs because officers are not the focal subject of their own video and thus, intent is not ascribed to them. This effect is less likely to be present in the routine encounters described above by Mike Gennaco. Bias is not limited strictly to BWCs, as any video angle that emphasizes a single actor may increase intentionality judgments of that actor. However, because BWCs are outward facing, the viewpoint is that of the officer, making the subject the focal actor, and increasing the likelihood of bias towards that actor. One way the

²⁵ Olas Carayannis. BWC and Document Request Issues with the NYPD. July 5, 2019. https://brooklyneagle.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/20190710_boardmtg_BWC_memo-2-1.pdf; Olas Carayannis & Dane Buchanan, CCRB Memo on Body Cam Footage. June 26, 2020. <https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6980787-CCRB-Memo-on-Body-Cam-Footage.html>; NYC CCRB @CCRB_NYC Twitter account. Sep 12, 2019. “Unless there is a significant change, the backlog of CCRB requests for video evidence will continue to increase and impair the CCRB’s ability to complete investigations within the 18-month statute of limitations.”

²⁶ Eric Umansky & Mollie Simon. The NYPD Is Withholding Evidence from Investigations Into Police Abuse. ProPublica. Aug. 17, 2020.

²⁷ Aliza Chasan, Ayana Harry , & Anthony DiLorenzo. NYPD officers may be intentionally interfering with body cam video: CCRB. PIX11 News. Feb 27, 2020; Christina Carrega. Some NYPD officers tip each other off when body cameras are on: watchdog report. ABC News. February 27, 2020.

²⁸ Turner, B.L., Caruso, E.M., Dilich, M.A., & Roese, N.J. (2019). Body camera footage leads to lower judgments of intent than dash camera footage. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, 116(4), 1201-1206.

researchers interpret these findings is that BWCs can reduce officer accountability by influencing the public, particularly those susceptible to camera-bias, to not indict officers when they otherwise would if given only the written report or shown dashcam footage. In addition, without proper safeguards, BWC footage is subject to manipulation – by officers turning cameras on and off to capture only favorable footage, providing misleading verbal narratives, etc., which can also undermine accountability by influencing the viewers perception of the footage. The Committee’s Model Policy is intended to minimize as much as possible the opportunities officers will have for such manipulation.

Similarly, a second study shows that, when witnesses view BWC footage, they tend to rate officer behavior more favorably (hence, less culpably) than if they view the same incident from surveillance video that captures both the officer and the civilian:

[P]articipants who watched body-camera footage, compared with people who watched surveillance footage of the same encounter, perceived the officer’s behavior as being more justified and made more lenient punishment decisions.... [O]ur findings support the illusory causation hypothesis for BWC footage: people hold more favorable ratings of police officer’s actions and intent during violent interactions when they see BWC footage than when they see a third-person perspective.²⁹

The study also found, however, that “[t]he camera perspective only affected what people thought about the officer’s actions, not the civilian’s actions.”³⁰ Despite this potential for a biasing effect, the researchers noted, in the introduction to their paper, that “there is little doubt that BWCs have improved police transparency—at least in jurisdictions where the footage is routinely released,” while noting that “the technology is still imperfect.”³¹ Moreover, the study found that “participants who viewed the BWC and then surveillance footage provided ratings for the officer that were not statistically different from participants who only viewed the surveillance footage, suggesting that multiple camera perspectives help reduce bias resulting from the BWC footage.”³²

Combined, this research highlights not only the potential for BWC footage from a single angle to produce biased interpretations of an incident (thereby impeding the sought-after enhanced accountability), but also the potential that providing multiple camera perspectives has for correcting those biased perceptions, and thus for enhancing accountability. It is for this reason that the Committee’s Model Policy requires all officers on the scene to activate their BWCs—to try to increase the likelihood that multiple angles and perspectives are captured, including views from one officer’s camera that might capture the movements and actions of other officers—and requires that the MPD receive and treat all other footage from any other source (e.g., civilian bystander footage, surveillance camera footage, etc.) the same as BWC

²⁹ Jones, K.A., Crozier, W.E., & Strange, D. (2019), Look there! The effect of perspective, attention, and instructions on how people understand recorded police encounters. *Behavioral Sciences & the Law* 37 (6), 711-731, 711.

³⁰ *Id.*, p. 718.

³¹ *Id.*, p. 712.

³² *Id.*, p. 718.

footage. It is also for these reasons that this Report and Model Policy recommend prompt and ready access, to the extent permissible while accommodating privacy interests, to BWC footage by prosecutors, defense lawyers, the public, and the Independent Monitor and Civilian Oversight Board. The Committee's hope is that by creating as many video images of an incident as possible, the potential for bias is minimized and that, coupled with routine release of the footage, real accountability might be made possible, although the Committee recognizes that obtaining multiple perspectives may not always be possible as a means of mitigating perceptual bias.

The Committee is well aware that the track record on using BWCs to hold officers who have engaged in misconduct accountable in other jurisdictions has not been promising. Rarely have officers been subject to serious consequences, even when misconduct is captured in BWC footage. That reality is more a consequence of the use the decision-makers have made of the BWC footage than it is a necessary feature of the BWC footage. No one should expect BWCs alone to change institutional structures that in some places protect police from appropriate sanctions for misconduct. BWCs are a tool, and whether they are used to impose appropriate sanctions depends on the institutions, individuals, and rules that govern the resolution of allegations of misconduct. Madison is embarking on a new civilian oversight process (along with other initiatives designed to heal rifts between the MPD and Madison's marginalized communities such as the MPD Black Officers Coalition) that may enhance the opportunities and climate for appropriate oversight, although it is too early to know how effective they will be.

- **Increased civility**

Some proponents of BWCs argue that the presence of a camera will improve civility, by both police and civilians. If both parties know their actions are being recorded, this theory contends, they may be less likely to act badly. There is, however, very little if any empirical (or even anecdotal) evidence to support this effect. White et al. (2017) note that a civilizing effect would require meeting the preconditions that the citizen is aware of the camera's presence and, more importantly, that they are thinking rationally during the encounter. These authors note, "Research has shown for decades that police frequently deal with citizens who are upset, traumatized, angry, under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and mentally ill and in crisis.... All of the aforementioned issues can cloud someone's judgment and reduce the likelihood he or she will be able to rationally understand the implications of being recorded; and make the decision to change one's behavior."³³

- **Fewer civilian complaints**

A possible reduction in civilian complaints against officers is potentially both a "pro" and a "con." Research generally supports the contention that BWCs will reduce civilian complaints against police—on average, across high-quality studies to date, by 16.6%, although some studies

³³ White, M. D., Todak, N., & Gaub, J. E. (2017). Assessing citizen perceptions of body-worn cameras after encounters with police. *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management*, 40, 689-703.

show no effect.³⁴ What is unclear from the research, however, is *why* BWCs reduce civilian complaints. The research reviewed by the Committee notes that it could be because BWCs reduce police misconduct, or it could be that civilians, knowing that the incident is recorded, are dissuaded from filing frivolous complaints, or it could be that police are able to use BWC footage to resolve complaints informally or otherwise encourage people not to file complaints.

It is worth noting that just because complaints go down, it does not necessarily mean greater public satisfaction with police. Goodison and Wilson (2017), in their randomized controlled experiment, found a reduction in complaints with officers wearing BWCs, but no significant differences in citizens' satisfaction with the interaction, perception of police legitimacy, or views of police professionalism.³⁵

- **Reduced police use of force and deaths at police hands**

Much of the debate about BWCs has focused on the possibility that their use might reduce police uses of force. Advocates tout the potential for cameras to rein in police violence, while critics argue that cameras have shown no such effect, and that therefore BWCs are not worth the expense and other tradeoffs. Frequently, the Committee heard from BWC critics that cameras have not stopped police violence. The social science research is not entirely consistent on the effect on police applications of force, but overall shows no significant reduction in police use of force. An anticipated reduction in police use of force appears to have been the primary reason for rapid implementation of BWCs across many cities, following the release of a study that appeared to show such an effect in 2014.³⁶ Subsequent research has not upheld that result, as a generalizable finding. However, some proponents of BWCs argue that the debate may have become overly focused on this question. To expect BWCs to significantly reduce police violence is to expect too much and miss other sources of potential value, or potential downsides, of BWCs.

There is a substantial amount of research on this point, although the results are mixed and in combination suggest little reason to expect BWCs to reduce uses of force, at least on their own. Initial research suggested that BWCs can have a dramatic effect on reducing police uses of

³⁴ Lum, C., Koper, C.S., Wison, D.B., Stoltz, M., Goodier, M., Eggins, E., Higginson, A., & Mazerolle, L. (2020). Body-worn cameras' effects on police officers and citizen behavior: A systematic review. Source. Campbell Systematic Review.

³⁵ Goodison, S., & Wilson, T. (2017). Citizen perceptions of body worn cameras: A randomized controlled trial. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.

³⁶ Ariel, B., Farrar, W.A., & Sutherland, A. (2015). The Effect of Police Body-Worn Cameras on Use of Force and Citizens' Complaints Against the Police: A Randomized Controlled Trial, *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* 31, 509-535, 524-25.

force,³⁷ but recent, much more comprehensive, research has suggested that BWCs have no discernible, statistically significant effects on use of force.³⁸

A study released in 2014, based on a randomized controlled trial conducted in Rialto, California, appeared to show that wearing BWCs generated a 50% reduction in use of force reports relative to not wearing cameras during comparison shifts.³⁹ In Arizona, the Mesa Police Department's quasi-experimental evaluation of BWCs reported a 75% decline in use of force complaints.⁴⁰ In Orlando, Florida, a randomized experiment found that BWC officers had a significantly lower rate of incidents involving electronic control devices, chemical agents, impact weapons, and other non-lethal implements.⁴¹

A large randomized-controlled study in Washington, D.C., however, found no statistically significant effect on police use of force, citizen complaints, policing activity, or judicial outcomes.⁴² Likewise, a multisite randomized experiment involving 2,122 officers across ten sites in eight police departments reported no overall reduction in officer use of force, with significant increases in some cities and decreases in others.⁴³ And a recent study by the Urban Institute of the Milwaukee Police Department's BWC program found no reduction in police uses of force.⁴⁴

³⁷ Braga, A.A., Sousa, W.H., Colden, J.R. Jr., & Rodriguez, D. (2018). The Effects of Body-Worn Cameras on Police Activity and Police-Citizen Encounters: A Randomized Controlled Trial, *Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology* 108(3), 511- 538; Ariel, B., Farrar, W.A., & Sutherland, A. (2015). The Effect of Police Body-Worn Cameras on Use of Force and Citizens' Complaints Against the Police: A Randomized Controlled Trial, *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* 31, 509-535, 524-25; Hedberg, E.C., Katz, C.M., & Choate, D.E. (2017). Body-Worn Cameras and Citizen Interactions with Police Officers: Estimating Plausible Effects Given Varying Compliance Levels, *Justice Quarterly*, 34(4), 627–651, 642; Jennings, W.G., Lynch, M.D., & Fridell, L.A. (2015). Evaluating the Impact of Police Officer Body-Worn Cameras (BWCs) on Response-to-Resistance and Serious External Complaints: Evidence from the Orlando Police Department (OPD) Experience Utilizing a Randomized Controlled Experiment, *Journal of Criminal Justice* 43, 480-486, 485.

³⁸ LYNNE GROSSMITH ET AL., POLICE, CAMERA, EVIDENCE: LONDON'S CLUSTER RANDOMISED CONTROLLED TRIAL OF BODY WORN VIDEO 15 (2015).

³⁹ Ariel, Farrar, & Sutherland (2015), pp. 523-24.

⁴⁰ MESA POLICE DEP'T, ON-OFFICER BODY CAMERA SYSTEM: PROGRAM EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 11 (2013).

⁴¹ Jennings, Lynch, & Fridell (2015), p. 485.

⁴² DAVID YOKUM, ANITA RAVISHANKAR, AND ALEXANDER COPPOCK, EVALUATING THE EFFECTS OF POLICE BODY-WORN CAMERAS: A RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED STUDY 18 (2017).

⁴³ Ariel, B., et al. (2016). Wearing body cameras increases assaults against officers and does not reduce police use of force: Results from a global multi-site experiment. *European Journal of Criminology* 13(6), 744-755, 750.

⁴⁴ BRUCE E. PETERSON, LILLY YU, & NANCY LA VIGNE, THE MILWAUKEE POLICE DEPARTMENT'S BODY-WORN CAMERA PROGRAM: EVALUATION FINDINGS AND KEY TAKEAWAYS (May 2018).

Interpreting these results is complicated by the fact that it appears that the Washington, D.C., and the Milwaukee studies employed a methodology that can reduce the magnitude of effects of BWCs. Both studies randomized the deployment of BWCs at the officer level, rather than the shift level, which means that at recordable incidents some officers might show up equipped with BWCs and some officers at the scene might be assigned to the non-BWC group. In such cases, the presence of the BWCs may influence the behaviors of officers not wearing BWCs just as much as the officers wearing BWCs. Any potential reduction in use of force that might be produced by BWCs may be under-recognized in this research.⁴⁵

However, a lack of a significant reduction in police use of force was also found across studies that randomized by shift. A 2020 meta-analysis of existing BWC trials, including those that randomized by officer, shift, or other, found that “[t]he use of BWCs does not have consistent or significant effects on officers’ use of force...”⁴⁶ The authors noted, “Overall, there remains substantial uncertainty about whether BWCs can reduce officer use of force, but the variation in effects suggests there may be conditions in which BWC could be effective.”⁴⁷ In particular, they wrote that “restricting officer discretion in turning on and off BWCs may reduce police use of force, but more assessment is needed.”⁴⁸

The largest multi-city study to date (referenced above), involving randomized controlled trials across ten sites in eight cities with randomization by shift, for a total of 2.2 million officer hours, also found no average change in use of force.⁴⁹ The study noted, however, that the effects were not uniform: “the variability in our results also tells us that the BWVs worked *in some places, some of the time*, but did not work in others.”⁵⁰ In this study as well in as some others, BWCs exacerbated use of force in some cities in statistically significant ways. The authors hypothesized, “One direct explanation might be that BWVs escalate an already inflamed police–public encounter, which results in more rather than less force being used. It might be that when BWVs are introduced into some ongoing police–public interactions, the suspect, officer or both become more aggressive.”⁵¹

While the general trend in the research has been to show no effect on police use of force, the results are not uniform, and so it is possible that BWCs can have more positive or negative effects in some places, under some circumstances, than others. Researchers have noted that some

⁴⁵ For a discussion of the confounding effects of camera assignment at the individual, rather than shift, level in the research, see Ariel, B., Sutherland, A., & Sherman, L.W. (2019). Preventing treatment spillover contamination in criminological field experiments: the case of body-worn police cameras. *Journal of Experimental Criminology* 15:569-591.

⁴⁶ Lum et al. (2020), p. 2.

⁴⁷ Lum et al. (2020), p. 1.

⁴⁸ Lum et al. (2020), p. 2.

⁴⁹ Ariel et al. (2016), p. 752 (emphasis in original).

⁵⁰ Ariel et al. (2016), p. 752.

⁵¹ Ariel et al., (2016), p. 752.

of the variability in research results might be in part a result of variation in agency policies regarding how the devices should be used.⁵²

Nonetheless, from the available research, the Committee concluded that BWCs alone are not likely to have significant positive effects on reductions in police uses of force. If BWCs are employed in Madison, they must be viewed as only one tool, and they must be adopted in conjunction with a wide range of other reforms aimed at minimizing force incidents and improving police/community relations. What is most important is that the City guard against relying too much on BWCs, at the expense of following through with the other 177 recommendations made by the Ad Hoc Committee.

Moreover, similar to the findings around police transparency discussed earlier, the research suggests that BWCs can only be expected to have any positive impacts or effects on police uses of force if police are not given discretion about when to turn on and off the video recording equipment. To be effective, it is essential that recording be automatic and non-discretionary in appropriate situations, to the greatest extent possible, and that officers be permitted to stop recording only under carefully prescribed and monitored circumstances. In a post hoc re-analysis of the multisite randomized experiment data cited above, which showed no reduction in police use of force, Professor Barak Ariel and his colleagues found that use of force by officers decreased by 37% in three sites with high compliance to a BWC policy that required officers to record every interaction with the public and to notify citizens that they were being recorded at the beginning of the encounter.⁵³ Ariel and his colleagues also reported a 71% increase in officer use of force in four sites with low compliance to this BWC policy.⁵⁴ Because this study was merely a re-analysis of previous data, the results should not be taken as conclusive, but they are suggestive. Moreover, these results align with the results of a meta-analysis by Lum et al. (2020) across 22 trials, which suggested a lower use of force where departmental policies provided less discretion. Lum et al. also observed, “Additional studies, however, are needed to establish whether use of force can be reduced when an agency restricts officer discretion in how they use BWCs.”⁵⁵ Nonetheless, these findings reinforce the Committee’s conclusion that any BWC system the City might adopt must dramatically reduce officer discretion about use of the cameras. Our model policy incorporates these checks on discretion.

⁵² Lum, C., Stoltz, M., Koper, S.K., & Scherer, J.A. (2019). Research on body-worn cameras: what we know, what we need to know. *Criminology & Public Policy* 18:93-118.

⁵³ Ariel, B. et al. (2016). Increases in Police Use of Force in the Presence of Body-Worn Cameras are Driven by Officer Discretion: A Protocol-Based Subgroup Analysis of Ten Randomized Experiments, *Eur. J. Criminology* 12:453-463, 459.

⁵⁴ *Id.*

⁵⁵ Lum, C., Koper, C.S., Wilson, D.B., Stoltz, M., Goodier, M., Eggins, E., Higginson, A., & Mazerolle, L. (2020). Body-worn cameras’ effects on police officers and citizen behavior: A systematic review. Source. Campbell Systematic Review.

- **Quicker case resolution**

BWCs may lead to faster resolution of cases. The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department found reduced time to investigate an average misconduct complaint when BWC evidence was present.⁵⁶ A New York Times article has noted, “[P]olice officials from Oakland to Greensboro, N.C., all cited the swift resolution of complaints against officers as one of the primary benefits body cameras had offered.”⁵⁷ There also may be an impact on processing of criminal charges. A study in Los Angeles found that filing decisions for misdemeanor criminal charges occurred more rapidly for cases in which BWC video was available. Prosecutors there only viewed the BWC footage in a small fraction of cases before they filed charges – it appears that the mere presence of BWC evidence led them to file charges more quickly.⁵⁸

Three older studies in the U.K. reported an increase in the rate of guilty pleas in cases with BWC footage,⁵⁹ but the number of cases was small and, as Lum et al. (2019) note, “Conclusions from these studies should be taken cautiously, however, given the weaknesses in their research designs.”⁶⁰ A study in Phoenix reported an increase in the number of guilty pleas, but the percentage of cases resolved with pleas was small and no test of statistical significance was done for changes in plea rates.⁶¹

However, not all research found this to be the case, and the addition of BWCs can sometimes lead to an *increase* in time required to process a case. A large randomized controlled trial in Washington, D.C., found no significant change in the rate of guilty pleas in criminal cases

⁵⁶ Braga, A., Coldren, J.R. Jr., Sousa, W., Rodriguez, D., Alper, O. (2017). The benefits of body-worn cameras: New findings from a randomized controlled trial at the Las Vegas metropolitan police (Cent Naval Analyses, Arlington, VA), Technical Report 251416.

⁵⁷ Ian Lovett, *In California, a Champion for Police Cameras*, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2013), <https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/22/us/in-california-a-champion-for-police-cameras.html>

⁵⁸ Groff, E.R., Ward, J.T., and Wartell, J. (2018). The Role of Body-worn Camera Footage in the Decision to File. Report for the Laura and John Arnold Foundation, p. 35. Philadelphia, PA: Criminal Justice Department, Temple University.

⁵⁹ Goodall, M. (2007). Guidance for the police use of body-worn video devices: Police and Crime Standards Directorate. London: Home Office; Ellis, T., Jenkins, C., & Smith, P. (2015). Evaluation of the introduction of personal issue body worn video cameras (Operation Hyperion) on the Isle of Wight: Final report to Hampshire Constabulary. Portsmouth: Institute of Criminal Justice Studies, University of Portsmouth; ODS Consulting [Andrew Fyfe]. 2011. Body worn video projects in Paisley and Aberdeen, self evaluation.

⁶⁰ Lum, C., Stoltz, M., Koper, C. S., & Scherer, J. A. (2019). Research on body-worn cameras: What we know, what we need to know. *Criminology & Public Policy*, 18(1), 93–118.

⁶¹ Katz, C. M., Choate, D. E., Ready, J. R., & Nuño, L. (2014). Evaluating the impact of officer body worn cameras in the Phoenix police department. Phoenix: Center for Violence Prevention and Community Safety, Arizona State University.

with BWC footage available.⁶² A large randomized controlled trial by the Western Australia Police Force also found no change in the rate of guilty pleas when BWC footage was available.⁶³ The Phoenix study also found that “when we examined the number of days it took to process a case [i.e., to a final disposition], and compared our post-test comparison group to our post-test camera group, our findings suggested that body cameras resulted in an increase in the amount of time that it takes to process a case to completion by about 80 percent” (a mean of 44 versus 78 days).⁶⁴ This data is again a bit hard to interpret, however, because the study authors noted that case processing time overall went down after the introduction of BWCs, but that it went down more for cases with no BWC footage: “we found that there were significant declines in the number of days it took to dispose of a case from the pre-test to the post-test period, with a pre-test case averaging 96 days to process compared to a post-test average of 44 (comparison) and 78 days (camera). We also found that following camera implementation there was a significant change in both time to dismissal and guilty pleas, each declining during the post-test period. It should be noted that case processing time declined the greatest among the non-camera wearing comparison group. This may be attributed to changes in the administrative management of cases after camera deployment.”⁶⁵

BWCs might also affect time to resolution in civil court cases. This could potentially include an increase in the rate of summary judgements⁶⁶ (see, also, “Potential decreased access to jury trial and an increase in inappropriate summary judgements in civil cases” in the “cons” section of this report).

- **Training opportunities**

Video footage provides an opportunity for training—both in one-on-one review of incidents with involved officers, and in academy or other classroom settings for groups of officers. With such footage, other officers may be able to learn from officer experiences and refine their techniques and responses to volatile situations. In their report on the Milwaukee experience with BWCs, representatives of the Milwaukee Police Department told the Committee that they are able to use bad examples from BWC footage to show officers what is unacceptable, and they routinely hear from officers that they watched their camera footage, and they were glad they had it because they knew they had to behave in a way that was like being on TV. They said that in Milwaukee the Department stresses the need to use BWC footage for training and

⁶² Yokum, D., Ravishankar, A., & Coppock, A. (2019). A randomized control trial evaluating the effects of police body-worn cameras. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, 116(21), 10329-10332.

⁶³ Clare, J., Henstock, D., McComb, C., Newland, R., & Barnes, G.C. (2019). The results of a randomized controlled trial of police body-worn video in Australia. *Journal of Experimental Criminology*. Published online.

⁶⁴ *Id.* at p. 38.

⁶⁵ Katz et al., p. 38.

⁶⁶ Wasserman, H.M. (2015). Moral Panic and Body Cameras. *Washington University Law Review*, 831-843, 844.

learning. Similarly, representatives of the Fitchburg Police Department told the Committee that BWC footage provides a valuable training opportunity.

- **More evidence for resolving complaints and charges**

BWCs add to the quantity and quality, of evidence available to fact-finders. Whether that is a net positive or negative depends on how the evidence is collected, interpreted, and used, but the addition of BWC footage does indeed provide more evidence to help fact-finders determine what happened.

In discussions about BWCs, additions to the evidentiary picture are typically considered in the context of sorting out what happened in a discrete police/civilian encounter. But BWCs can also add to the collection of evidence, and hence to the system's ability to find the facts accurately, on a wide range of incidents beyond the discrete officer/civilian encounter captured in the video. One effect of BWCs, which is often overlooked in the debates about BWCs, is that BWCs can provide recordings not only of police confrontations with suspects in the field, but also with *all witnesses* whom they interview.

A significant reform in police investigation practices from recent years has been the widespread requirement for electronic recording of custodial interrogations of suspects. To almost everyone's surprise, the study of wrongful convictions in the last 30 years has revealed that a leading contributor to conviction of the innocent, present in nearly 25% of the DNA exoneration cases, is false confessions—that is, confessions, often to very serious crimes such as rapes or murders, that the suspect actually did not commit. And one of the reasons that false confessions have been so alarmingly prevalent in even very serious cases is that police were able to employ coercive and suggestive interrogation techniques in the secrecy of the stationhouse interrogation room. Electronic recording of custodial interrogations—which became a requirement under Wisconsin law in 2005—changed that. While false confessions still occur, electronic recording of interrogations has been universally heralded as a deterrent to misconduct in the interrogation room, and as a truth-revealing process that exposes both the tactics employed by police and the full truth about what suspects said—which sometimes benefits the police and prosecution, and sometimes benefits the suspect, depending on what actually occurred in the interrogation, as revealed by the recordings. BWCs can offer recordings of interviews conducted in the field, thus capturing interviews in less formal settings, and increase visibility to false confessions.

Statements from third-party witnesses are even more prevalent in criminal cases than are statements from suspects, but currently nothing compels (or would even make it practical) to electronically record witness interviews, or even suspect interviews outside the custodial setting. Yet disputes arise routinely in criminal cases about what police told the witnesses, and what the suspects said. Without recordings, all that is available for fact-finders is a swearing contest between the police officer and the witness (often people of color or other marginalizing background). In such cases, as Judge Everett told the Committee, the police win those swearing contests almost every time—even if they are, unbeknownst to the factfinder, not telling the truth.

BWCs can remedy that imbalance by providing a verbatim electronic recording of all of those investigative encounters. One thing we heard from the Fitchburg police was that, even in instances where the video portion of their BWC footage is blurred, misdirected, or grainy, the audio portion of the recordings is almost always crystal clear. No doubt in many cases recordings of witness interviews will confirm the police investigator’s version of the interview. In some cases, however—no doubt a smaller percentage of cases, but a very important percentage indeed—those recordings may reveal what the police officer’s retelling of the interview alone often will not—that the witness was inappropriately led or pushed to make an incriminating statement, or in fact said something entirely different in substance or emphasis than the officer thought they heard or that they reported.

Legal analysts routinely report that the existence of BWC footage reduces fact-finding burdens on courts because it provides a more reliable, and verifiable account of the facts rather than depending simply on competing narratives of officers and subjects. That was the message the Committee heard from a variety of legal experts, including Judge Everett Mitchell, Mike Gennaco, representatives of the State Public Defender’s Office, and District Attorney Ismael Ozanne.

Additional anecdotal evidence also supports this potential benefit of BWCs. In 2013, Judge Shira A. Scheindlin of the federal district court in New York City issued a ruling finding police stop and frisk practices to be unconstitutional because police were targeting people for stops based on their race.⁶⁷ Judge Scheindlin noted that her decision in the case was handicapped by the reality that she was “relegated to finding facts based on the often conflicting testimony of eyewitnesses” since there was “no contemporaneous recording of the stop (such as could be achieved through the use of a body-worn camera) . . .”⁶⁸ To remedy the constitutional violation and address this problem, Judge Scheindlin ordered, among other things, “a trial program requiring the use of body-worn cameras in one precinct per borough . . .”⁶⁹ However, it is also worth noting that while NYPD has readily provided access to the resulting BWC footage for prosecution of civilians defendants, it has obstructed access by police abuse investigators, prompting Judge Scheindlin (now retired) to note, “This just seems like contempt. I understand privacy concerns. But they’re refusing to meet their obligations.”

BWCs can also bring evidentiary value in helping to protect police officers from false allegations of misconduct or abuse, and can thereby increase accountability for civilians as well as for police. With a video record, it will be inherently more difficult for civilians to make false or misleading claims of police misconduct.

However, in considering all the above, it is important to note that MPD officers operating squad cars with dashcams wear microphones, and audio record some encounters with the public. Many of the aforementioned argued benefits of BWCs concern verbal interactions (e.g., police interrogations) and other auditory evidence. When the evidence that matters is auditory (e.g.,

⁶⁷ *Floyd v. City of New York*, 959 F.Supp.2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).

⁶⁸ *Id.* at 562.

⁶⁹ *Id.*

what police said, what suspects said, what witnesses said, someone’s yell, etc.), it theoretically can be captured by microphones without BWCs. However, under current policies, audio recording is not required nearly extensively as the use of BWCs under this committee’s Model Policy.

Dane County District Attorney Ismael Ozanne and State Public Defender Kelli Thompson both told the Committee that video footage has been used both to help solidify charges against suspects and to vindicate criminal defenses and civilian complaints against police, in ways that would not have been possible without the footage. Survey data from McCluskey et al. (2019) shows that both prosecutors and defense attorneys support the implementation of BWCs as an evidence-collection tool.⁷⁰ “[A] statistically reliable contrast between the groups of respondents[—prosecutors (ADAs) and public defenders (PDs)—]involved the statement, ‘Attorneys in your office support the use of BWCs by law enforcement.’ Surprisingly, 81 percent of the PDs strongly agreed with this statement whereas 56 percent of the ADAs strongly agreed.”⁷¹ “86 percent of PDs agreed or strongly agreed that BWCs could produce major differences with testimony, but only 18 percent of ADAs agreed or strongly agreed. General agreement between prosecutors (ADAs) and public defenders (PDs) were found in that both groups believe that BWCs improved their respective abilities to defend or prosecute cases.”⁷² Both prosecutors and public defenders agree that BWCs increase pleas.⁷³ “Slightly more than two-thirds of PDs (67.5 percent) agreed or strongly agreed that BWCs would increase the likelihood of dismissal, compared to 30 percent of ADAs.”⁷⁴ “Sixty-six percent of PDs agreed/strongly agreed that BWCs increased the likelihood of acquittals, whereas 61 percent of ADAs agreed/strongly agreed that they increased the likelihood of convictions.”⁷⁵

Meanwhile, in a separate national survey of state prosecutor’s offices (i.e., surveying 321 lead prosecutors), 79.5% indicated that prosecutors in their offices support BWC use, and large majorities believed that BWC evidence will help the prosecution more than it will assist the defense (62.7%), producing increases in convictions.⁷⁶ Likewise, a recent separate survey of

⁷⁰ John McCluskey et al., *The Evidentiary Value of Body-Worn Camera Footage: A survey of Prosecutors and Public Defenders* (Jan. 2019). Retrieved from https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A_www.bwctta.com_sites_default_files_Files_Resources_Evidentiary-2520Value-2520of-2520BWC-2520Footage-5FFINAL-5F0.pdf&d=DwMF-g&c=byefhD2ZumMFFQYPZBagUCDuBiM9Q9twmxaBM0hCgII&r=GX4Y7xW57tUvnbPi_LoBPVDI RG5jZglbjCaSa0D_MvBcmqT7Db0NcUOrfIojqqI&m=n55iYj-0I0cIWFLWAzU8jZAMRQPo-rlaxfhvLPcTrKI&s=3IsY3J8AN5y6wH_i-DG_btN3tzkRvGRUrVkneB2YNgg&e=.

⁷¹ *Id.* at 7.

⁷² *Id.*, p. 11.

⁷³ *Id.*, p. 12.

⁷⁴ *Id.*

⁷⁵ *Id.*

⁷⁶ Merola, L.M., Lum, C., Koper, C.S., and Scherer, A. (2016). *Body Worn Cameras and the Courts: A National Survey of State Prosecutors*. Report for the Laura and JohnArnold Foundation. Fairfax, VA: Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy, George Mason University.

public defenders in Virginia who have experience working with BWC footage revealed that “public defenders were overwhelmingly supportive of BWC use by their local law enforcement agencies.”⁷⁷ Public defenders reported that BWCs assisted them in learning how police do business, preparing a good defense for their clients, identifying potential otherwise unknown witnesses or defense options, alerting them to defenses or avenues they should *not* pursue (thereby saving time and helping them to avoid going down dead-ends), helping them to better prepare for client interviews and hearings, and helping to mitigate client expectations of reasonable case outcomes.⁷⁸ In sum, the surveys found that, after working with BWC footage, public defenders said that “BWC footage can also bring *everyone* involved in the case closer to resolution. As one attorney described, ‘It brings you, the Commonwealth, your client—it brings everybody to an agreed understanding of the case much sooner.’”⁷⁹

Mike Gennaco of OIR, who presented to our committee, noted of BWCs, and the time burden they impose on public defenders:

This has had a real impact on public defenders who have had to deal with this in so many ways. They just are overwhelmed with this information.... Sifting through all that information is making it very difficult for public defenders. I think an unintended consequence is, as a result of that, we’re getting more pleas. Because the public defenders don’t have the resources to go through that body of evidence.

The recent survey of public defenders in Virginia referenced above found that public defenders agree—BWCs increase their workload. But the survey indicates that public defenders believe BWCs are nonetheless worth the extra effort: Public defenders reported that “BWCs create a time-intensive burden on public defenders, but are deemed to be exceptionally useful.”⁸⁰

- **Effect on liability**

Some have speculated that BWC implementation might beneficially impact misconduct lawsuits and settlements. However, data to this point in cities where this has been tracked does not appear to bear that out, or show any clear, consistent pattern. Given that randomized controlled trials of BWCs have not, on average, shown a reduction in use of force, this may not be surprising. In addition, Bill H. Nesbitt, CPP, president of Security Management Services International, Inc. notes that body cameras may create additional liability if an officer fails to adhere to the proper protocols.

Overall, there is no consistent pattern apparent. If BWCs do impact liability, the effects

⁷⁷ Gaub, J.E., Naoroz, C., Malm, A. (2019). Understanding the Impact of Police Body-Worn Cameras on Virginia Public Defenders, A report submitted to the Virginia Indigent Defense Commission. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340260677_Understanding_the_impact_of_police_body-worn_cameras_on_Virginia_public_defenders, p. 4.

⁷⁸ *Id.*, pp. 5-7.

⁷⁹ *Id.*, p. 7.

⁸⁰ *Id.*, p. 4.

may be negative or positive. The Police Executive Research Forum analyzed the impact on lawsuits and settlements in three cities that have implemented BWCs on large scale.⁸¹ Dallas data only included suits with payouts. After BWC implementation, number of such suits per year decreased slightly (-12%) and the average and median payouts increased (+287% and +262%). Data from Mesa and Phoenix included all suits, whether or not there was a payout. In Mesa, after BWC implementation, the number of suits per year increased (+71%) and the average number per year that resulted in payouts remained largely unchanged (-4.5%), while the average and median payouts of suits with payouts decreased (-97% and -90%). In Phoenix, the average number of suits per year and number of suits per year with payouts decreased (-37% and -58%), and the average payout in suits with payouts decreased (-52%) while the median payout in suits with payouts increased (+67%). A separate study of Oakland found that, after BWC implementation, the number of suits decreased (-43%) and the average payout increased (+23%).⁸² However, it is important to note that Oakland was under a strict consent decree, implementing many other reforms, so it is not really possible to isolate the effect of BWCs.

ANALYZING THE “CONS”: THE POTENTIAL DOWNSIDES OF BWCs

- **Increased criminalization, particularly affecting minorities**

One of the most challenging problems the research identifies with BWCs is the potential they have to increase criminalization—that is, the potential to increase rates at which especially low-level crimes are pursued through arrest, detention, and ultimately prosecution.

While a full and accurate understanding of the facts of an incident appears on its face to be desirable, body cam footage, which might facilitate such fuller understanding, remains just a tool. Whether that tool and the increased evidence it produces is a net social good or social cost depends again on how that tool is used. Over-criminalization based on that enhanced access to camera footage might in fact be a net harm, rather than a benefit.

The reality is that not all crime, and especially not all low-level crime, is observed, reported, investigated, or prosecuted. Nor could we prosecute all such crime, as our institutional capacity for processing all the cases and sanctioning all the wrongdoing is nowhere close to what we would need to do that. Nor would we really want full enforcement of the laws, as such full

⁸¹ Police Executive Research Forum. (2018). Costs and Benefits of Body-Worn Camera Deployments: Final Report. Retrieved from <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwiNh4Cn4rnuAhUJbc0KHcVSDfAQFjAAegQIARAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.policeforum.org%2Fassets%2FBWCCostBenefit.pdf&usg=AOvVaw3iK65NqXzBfvyFSyTHMFxM>.

⁸² Berdjis, N. (2016). A Descriptive Study on Police Body Cameras and Civil Liability Cases. Master’s Thesis, University of Colorado. Retrieved from <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjuPrF4rnuAhXPKs0KHR9ZBm4QFjAAegQIARAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fsearch.proquest.com%2Fopenview%2F467956b8d011e89457cd77587bc91d07%2F1%3Fpq-origsite%3Dgscholar%26cbl%3D18750%26diss%3Dy&usg=AOvVaw1NcO33V2iKORQfUo9yJCI7>.

enforcement would produce massive injustices and unintended consequences. As a society, we neither want nor could we afford full enforcement of all minor traffic, drug, or morality laws (e.g., adultery), for example. Few among us would want to see prosecuted the woman who provides her prescription anti-nausea medications to her horribly nauseated pregnant sister after her sister failed to refill her own prescription on time, although the act would constitute an illegal drug distribution. Few among us would want us all stopped and ticketed every time we fail to engage our turn indicators at precisely the right time, or every time we turn into the wide lane of traffic rather than the near one, or cruise in an otherwise safe manner five miles per hour above the speed limit. The same sense of justice should make us unwilling to pursue every, or an increased number of, low-level street incidents or victimless crimes, like sharing a cannabis cigarette on a street corner, or driving to work without incident in a car with lapsed license plates because of an inability to pay the registration renewal fee, or hanging out longer than a police officer deems appropriate in a public place (loitering).

While prosecution of some low-level offenses is no doubt unavoidable and can in the right circumstances serve legitimate purposes, an increase in arrests, detention, and prosecution for such offenses simply because of the happenstance of having bodycam footage runs the risk of increasing patterns of injustice and heightening community/police distrust. Moreover, social science research reveals that prosecuting some crimes can have a net negative impact on community stability and safety, by removing breadwinners, interrupting natural social structures, and making it in the end more difficult for prosecuted individuals to find work and housing and to become contributing members of their communities. A recent study, for example, found that adolescent boys (primarily Black and Latino) who are stopped by police “report more frequent engagement in delinquent behavior 6, 12, and 18 months later, independent of prior delinquency, a finding that is consistent with labeling and life course theories.”⁸³ The study concludes: “Police stops predict decrements in adolescents’ psychological well-being and may unintentionally increase their engagement in criminal behavior.”⁸⁴

There is evidence in the research that supports the concern that BWC implementation might increase the filing of charges by prosecutors, especially for lower-level crimes or misdemeanors. The increase in charging rates can be large and most people charged plead out. Misdemeanors account for about 80% of all arrests and 80% of state criminal dockets. BWCs thus have the potential to exacerbate the problem of overcriminalization, with the effect falling most heavily on the most highly policed communities (Black and Brown residents). In Madison, the proportion of arrests and charges that are against Black residents has continued to grow dramatically over the last two decades. One of the primary demands of Black Lives Matter protesters has been an end to overcriminalization of Black residents. This research suggests that BWCs could make this problem worse.

⁸³ del Toro, J. et al. (2019). The criminogenic and psychological effects of police stops on adolescent black and Latino boys, *PNAS* 116(17):8261-8268. Retrieved from <https://upenn.app.box.com/s/8qhyqawosea319oadpeb16f09h7q6aq3/file/737124787611>.

⁸⁴ *Id.*

Several studies suggest that BWC officers make more arrests and citations relative to their non-BWC counterparts.⁸⁵ A Phoenix, Arizona quasi-experimental evaluation concluded that BWCs increased officer productivity when measured by the number of arrests.⁸⁶ The evaluators reported that the number of arrests increased by about 17% among officers in the BWC treatment group compared to 9% among officers in the comparison group.⁸⁷ In Essex in the United Kingdom, a randomized controlled trial found that incidents attended by BWC officers were more likely to result in criminal charges as compared to incidents attended by control officers.⁸⁸ Researchers Ready and Young used a quasi-experimental analysis of field contact reports to examine whether BWCs influenced Mesa, Arizona, Police Department officer behavior during police-citizen encounters over a ten-month period.⁸⁹ The analysis suggested that BWC officers were less likely to perform stop-and-frisks and make arrests, but were more likely to give citations and initiate encounters.⁹⁰

This appears to be a consistent pattern across multiple studies that have examined the question. Prosecutors file more charges because they believe that, with bodycam video available, they have more evidence to sustain convictions. Many of the additional residents charged will actually be guilty of the crimes charged, but the overall impact on communities likely will be negative and increase racial disparities.

One of the most significant studies leading to this conclusion was conducted in 2018 for the Laura and John Arnold Foundation by Dr. Elizabeth Groff and her colleagues. In that study, which examined the effects of BWCs in Los Angeles County, Groff et al. noted at the outset that “little research exists on changes to charging patterns when BWC evidence is available.”⁹¹ To address that gap, they sought to compare charging outcomes in misdemeanor cases in Los Angeles in cases with BWC footage with those in misdemeanor cases without BWC footage. Their conclusion was that, when BWC evidence is associated with a case, the likelihood that the case is filed increases. The increase in probability of charging in cases with BWC footage was quite large (~2.4 times as likely) and highly statistically significant. Interestingly, the researchers also found that, while prosecution rates went up when BWC footage existed, that BWC footage had that effect only when prosecutors failed to review the footage prior to charging; when the

⁸⁵ Braga et al., p. 514-15; CHARLES KATZ ET AL., EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF OFFICER WORN BODY CAMERAS IN THE PHOENIX POLICE DEPARTMENT 31 (2014); CATHERIN OWENS ET AL., THE ESSEX BWV TRIAL: THE IMPACT OF BWV ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE OUTCOMES OF DOMESTIC ABUSE INCIDENTS 14–15 (2014); Ready, J. & Young, J. (2015). The Impact of On-Officer Video Cameras on Police-Citizen Contacts: Findings from a Controlled Experiment in Mesa, AZ. *Journal of Experimental Criminology* 11, 445-458, 452.

⁸⁶ Katz et al., p. 31.

⁸⁷ *Id.*

⁸⁸ Owens et al., p. 14-15.

⁸⁹ Ready & Young, pp. 448–49.

⁹⁰ *Id.*, p. 454.

⁹¹ *Id.*, p. 5.

prosecutors actually viewed the footage prior to charging, the rate of charging was lower than if video was not viewed.⁴⁷ This might be because prosecutors were more likely to view video to make a decision in cases in which they were uncertain whether a charge was supportable (weaker cases that were less likely to be charged in the first place) or because watching the video reduced the likelihood of charging.⁹²

It is not entirely clear whether the research that has shown charging increases across all jurisdictions examined to date means that similar charging increases are inevitable if BWCs were implemented in Madison, especially if Madison were to implement any BWC program in ways intentionally designed to prevent this effect. Unique features of the research and differences between contexts and policies could affect the impact on charging decisions.

Several factors caution against assuming that the research means charging rates will necessarily rise if Madison implements BWCs. First, while the data clearly show that cases with BWC footage are charged at a higher rate than cases without BWC footage, that does not necessarily mean that BWC led to an *increase* in charging or criminalization. What it shows rather is that, in the same time period, BWC-footage cases are charged more frequently than non-BWC-footage cases. Theoretically, it could be that BWCs have actually led to a decrease in charging in cases that lack video footage, rather than any increase in charging or criminalization. The research does not tell us which effect is being observed.

The Groff finding that charging rates *declined* when prosecutors actually viewed the footage, along with an on-the-ground explanation of practices in Los Angeles by Mike Gennaco, supports the possibility that BWCs might reduce charging in some cases. In the research, charging in cases that had BWC footage was in the aggregate higher than in cases where there was no BWC footage, despite the fact that prosecutors had a lower charging rate when they viewed BWC footage, because prosecutors rarely viewed the footage prior to charging.⁹³ Groff explained that, in Los Angeles, “the fundamental issue is that staffing levels [in the prosecutor’s office] are too low to keep up with the current number of cases that need to be evaluated for filing. As one attorney remarked ‘each day is triage’”⁹⁴ Moreover, under the system employed in Los Angeles, prosecutors did not have automatic access to BWC footage, but instead had to request access. As Gross concluded, “This decreases the likelihood a DCA

⁹² Groff, E.R., Ward, J.T., and Wartell, J. (2018). The Role of Body-worn Camera Footage in the Decision to File. Report for the Laura and John Arnold Foundation, p. 35. Philadelphia, PA: Criminal Justice Department, Temple University.

⁹³ To ensure that the Committee was interpreting Dr. Groff’s study correctly, on December 21, 2020, an email was sent to Dr. Groff personally, along with a copy of this paragraph and both the preceding and following paragraphs, to ask her if this text correctly assesses her findings. On December 28, 2020, she responded via email stating, “Your text does accurately assess the study. I appreciate that you emphasize the cross-sectional nature of the study and the finding of very low rates of watching video prior to filing or rejecting. We cannot say for certain what the findings would show if more attorneys watched the video but they do suggest that fewer cases are charged when video evidence is viewed prior to the charging decision.”

⁹⁴ Groff et al. (2018), p. 19.

[prosecutor] will take the time to consider video evidence.”⁹⁵ The result was that in the vast majority of cases, prosecutors made charging decisions without ever viewing the BWC footage—BWC video was viewed by the filing attorney 1.6% of the time and not viewed in 98.4% of the cases that had BWC footage.

Mike Gennaco of the OIR Group, who resides and works in Los Angeles, provided a first-hand explanation of what was happening in Los Angeles. He said that the District Attorney in Los Angeles County has declared that if there is no body camera footage, the DAs will not file (again, supporting the possibility that the existence of BWC footage in some cases might lead to a reduction of charging in others). Gennaco also said that the anecdotal information available in Los Angeles suggests, by contrast, that if there is BWC footage to support the arrest, the DA’s office has an inclination to file the charges, even without viewing the footage first (supporting the finding that BWCs produce a higher charging rate). Indeed, consistent with Groff’s findings, Gennaco told the Committee that, because of a lack of resources, charging decisions are almost always made without viewing the BWC footage first. If the footage is eventually viewed, and it doesn’t match up with the police report in the case, the case will then be dismissed. But in the meantime, negative consequences from the initial charging decision accrue—the defendant will have been arrested, will typically remain in jail unable to make bail, will lose work, and will face pressures to plead out to the case just to get out of jail.

An essential component of a BWC system is that all measures reasonably possible must be taken to ensure that prosecutors have and review BWC footage prior to making charging decisions. One way to do that is to get a commitment from the Dane County District Attorney’s Office, prior to adopting a BWC program, that the DA’s Office will review BWC footage prior to charging in every case, absent unavoidable complications that make it impossible or impractical in a given case. When Dane County District Attorney Ismael Ozanne presented to our Committee, a Committee member asked him if the DA’s Office would commit to adopting a formal policy requiring the prosecuting attorney to view BWC footage prior to charging. Mr. Ozanne responded, “We’d love to have bodycam footage so we can review it at charging, yeah.” He said that his office has been in discussions with law enforcement already about facilitating the transfer of video footage to his office promptly. He added, “I think it is very important for us to view the best evidence we have while we’re going to make a charging decision.” When asked if he would commit to a process in which BWC footage is obtained and reviewed promptly prior to charging, Mr. Ozanne said, “We are trying to actually get to that point.” But he said he cannot control law enforcement, and therefore he needs to work with them to set up an electronic transfer system to ensure prompt access to the footage. Mr. Ozanne concluded, “Hopefully we will be at that level soon where we will have the video as soon as possible and be able to view it at charging, in all cases. ... And, yeah, I would like that to be where we are. That would be, I guess, best practice.” When asked if he would adopt a policy that, when police are able to get his prosecutors the footage promptly, his attorneys would be required to view the footage prior to charging, he answered, “Yeah, I believe if we had the video we would view it, yes.” He added: “If we have the video we will be looking at the video to make charging decisions, yes.”

⁹⁵ *Id.*

The Committee is encouraged by the DA's receptiveness to viewing video footage prior to charging, though it would be more encouraged by a commitment to a thorough review policy. Because it appears that viewing footage prior to charging is so important to a successful BWC program, the Committee urges the City to pursue a more formalized agreement with the District Attorney's Office to ensure that footage is viewed whenever available prior to charging, and to make adoption of a BWC program contingent upon such formal agreement. Moreover, to make prompt viewing possible, the Committee recommends that the City, through the Madison Police Department, work with the Dane County District Attorney's Office and the State Public Defender's Office to create a technology system that permits prompt or immediate electronic transfer of BWC footage to those offices. Without such measures, BWCs run a significant risk of exacerbating racial disparities and racial tensions in Madison.

Dr. Groff's research suggests another important measure to facilitate pre-charging review of footage as well. One of the significant problems confronting prosecutors and defense attorneys is that BWC footage can often be voluminous. An incident may run many hours in length, and it may be captured by multiple officers on different cameras. The volume of footage can therefore make prompt review infeasible. To facilitate that reviewing process, Dr. Groff found that it was critical that police officers note in writing the points in the video that depict the significant events at issue (since the officers, having experienced the incident first-hand, will know where to direct the lawyers without searching through hours of footage).⁹⁶ The Committee therefore recommends that officers be required to annotate any footage sent to prosecutors and defense attorneys to direct them to the relevant portions of the footage to aid in their review.

Finally, to ensure that BWCs are not creating unintended consequences in terms of increased criminalization of primarily Black and marginalized community members, the Committee recommends that deliberate steps be taken to create a culture that guards against such an effect. This might be accomplished in part through training on the need to avoid increased criminalization, and through appropriate record-keeping. It is for this reason that the Committee recommends that any policy require police to make initial charging recommendations prior to viewing BWC footage, and to write a separate report noting any changes to that initial charging recommendation that might be made after the officers review BWC footage, along with a written explanation for such changes. These measures might reinforce the seriousness of changing the charging recommendations after viewing footage, and create a record of any patterns. It is also for this reason that the Committee recommends that the Department widely and regularly publicize to its officers, through training and other communications, that no officer will be disciplined in any way for failing to recommend charges that subsequent video review suggests were appropriate. The MPD should then maintain records of all arrest and charging patterns among BWC-equipped officers to discern whether BWCs are having the unintended consequence of increasing charging for low-level offenses. If so, and particularly if this is exacerbating racial disparities, the City should be prepared to reconsider its use of BWCs. And officers should be trained to be aware that such increases in charging recommendations could imperil the continued use of BWCs.

⁹⁶ Groff et al. (2018), p. 20.

- **Perceptual biases**

Ample research establishes that BWC footage can present a biased perspective of incidents that can enhance the appearance of chaos, danger, and threat posed by recorded subjects and reduce perceived intent and potential culpability of an officer. This occurs for a number of reasons. First, BWCs only show the perspective of the police officers wearing them, and may fail to capture critical context. Research shows that by focusing only on what the officer sees—and that means especially by focusing on the civilian subject—the cameras produce an effect that biases the viewer in favor of the officer and against the subject. One study found, for example, that viewer perspective—whether the viewer focused on the civilian or the officer— influenced interpretations of the video. Study participants who reported focusing on the civilian more than the officer or both reported more negative views of the civilian’s actions, but no difference in their assessments of the civilian’s character compared to those who reported focusing on the officer or both.⁹⁷ Participants who reported focusing on the civilian conversely rated the police officer more positively in their subjective judgments of the officer, the officer’s character, and the officer’s guilt than those who reported focusing on the police officer or both individuals.⁹⁸ However, viewer perspective did not affect how viewers reported the facts of the incident. The study concluded, “These findings taken together suggest that individuals make similar basic judgments when little interpretation about the police officer’s actions is needed, regardless of their focus during the encounter. When subjective judgments are made, focus away from the officer or focusing on the entire encounter results in more positive views of the officer.”⁵³

Another important perceptual distortion unique to BWCs is termed “deceptive intensity” – an interaction in BWC video can appear more intense than it actually was. As one study notes:

The attachment of the body cam to the uniform of the officer leads to an imbalanced representation of perspectives. The police perspective is emphasized by the footage that is literally taken from their perspective, in which others are filmed slightly from below, making them look bigger and more overwhelming. Also, the police officers’ movements create shaky footage with deceptive intensity that invokes the image of a hectic situation that calls for police action. Secondly, it is the officer who decides when to wear a camera and when to start and stop recording. This leaves the potential to not record any misconduct. Thirdly, access to the recorded images, whilst in theory open to police and citizens alike, is in practice exclusively for the police. Within the current regulatory framework, body cams are thus not neutral reporters of interactions between civilians and the police....

This imbalance was clearly visible in the imagery produced with the bodycams of the police officers that shot Arlon Sterling in the US in 2016. This imagery gives a hectic physical impression, sometimes called “deceptive intensity,” because of the jerkily moving images, the police screaming “Don’t fucking move!” and “Get on the ground!”

⁹⁷ Kalle, K. & Hammock, G. (2019). Bias in Video Evidence: Implications for Police Body Cameras. *Applied Psychology in Criminal Justice* 15(2):118-140.

⁹⁸ *Id.*

and the heavy breathing of the police officers. However, the same incident was filmed by a wall-mounted security camera. From this video it became clear that Sterling was not aggressive at all and that the shaky images were created because the police attacked him.⁹⁹

Perhaps the most important perceptual distortion is one in which BWC video of an incident results in lower observer judgments of the intentionality of police behavior (a measure of culpability) than dash cam video of the same incident.¹⁰⁰ This is closely connected to the concept of illusory causation - when the camera is focused on something, you assume they are the cause of what you are watching. As one study explains: “In general, attention is naturally drawn to the human form. Observers tend to attribute intentionality as a function of the visual salience of, and hence attention to, the focal actor. When an actor is visually deemphasized, judgments of the intentionality of that actor are reduced. The body cam wearer is typically less visually salient when depicted in body versus dashcam video, which corresponds with lower observer intentionality judgments.”⁵⁸ This is distinct from the effect of taking the wearer’s perspective. When the researchers asked some participants to “take the perspective of the police officer” it didn’t make much of a difference, suggesting that perspective-taking wasn’t the key factor driving people’s tendency to not blame the officer. Interestingly, however, this study also found that body cameras that captured even parts of the officer—arms and legs—eliminated the difference in intentionality assessments between viewers of footage from bodycams and dashcams.⁵⁹

Moreover, as an article about this study notes, the effect of the BWC video dominated other forms of evidence:

They found that people who watched a body cam version of an interaction—anything from the wearer bumping into someone to a police shooting—were less likely to believe that the person instigating that action did it on purpose, as compared to people who saw the same interaction filmed by a dash cam. There was a “diminished sense of blame or responsibility for the person who’s wearing the body cam,” Roese says.....

In a lab experiment, the researchers asked 203 people to read the report. Some participants also viewed body cam or dash cam footage of the incident. Then they had to decide whether the officer should be indicted on several different charges. Seventy-one percent of dash cam viewers recommended indicting for assault, 69 percent for battery, and 60 percent for aggravated battery. But among body cam viewers, those figures were only 49 percent, 53 percent, and 49 percent, respectively.

Surprisingly, people who read the report without watching any videos were about as likely to indict as the dash cam group. The researchers don’t know why, but they speculate that when people do watch a video, they tend to focus on that and pay less attention to the report. “Video dominates written words,” Turner says. “It’s almost like

⁹⁹ Houwing, Lotte, and Gerard Ritsema van Eck. (2020). Police Bodycams as Equiveillance Tools?: Reflections on the Debate in the Netherlands. *Surveillance & Society* 18(2): 284-287.

¹⁰⁰ Turner, B.L., Caruso, E.M., Dilich, M.A., Roese, N.J. (2019). Body camera footage leads to lower judgments of intent than dash camera footage (2019). *PNAS* 116(4):1201-1206.

the report exists less when there's a body cam.”

Another study similarly found that participants who watched body-camera footage, compared with people who watched surveillance footage of the same encounter, perceived the officer's behavior as being more justified and made more lenient punishment decisions.¹⁰¹ The researchers concluded: “Our results demonstrate that some body-camera footage—specifically videos that capture an officer using his or her body to apprehend a civilian—can lead to biased perceptions of police encounters that benefit the officer. Our findings suggest that this occurs because: (i) in body-camera footage, the civilian is the more easily visible figure, thus making less salient the officer's role in the encounter; and (ii) the body camera—attached to an officer's uniform—is unable to adequately capture certain use of force movements that are important in determining an officer's intent.”¹⁰² This perceptual distortion may insulate officers from accountability when video from their own BWC is available, especially when they were the only officer present, exacerbating the sense of a lack of accountability of police officers.

These studies and concerns make a powerful argument against BWCs. But the argument is not conclusive in itself. It is important to remember that *all* evidence is biased to one degree or another. Witness reports always reflect the perspectives and biases of the witness. Bystander video reflects other biases of perspective. Officers bent on framing a civilian can do so effectively without BWCs. While it is important to recognize the biases inherent in BWC footage, that does not necessarily mean that BWCs on balance obscure the “truth” more than they illuminate it. It is for this reason that BWCs must be considered within the wider context of all evidence gathered for a given case.

It is worth keeping in mind something that Mike Gennaco of OIR told the Committee. To reiterate, Gennaco said that BWC footage is most often useful in the low-level encounters, where there is no physicality, no chaotic shaking of the camera, and the real question is, for example, who said what, when. In those circumstances, the biasing effects of cameras are least pronounced, and the camera can clearly explain the encounter. Gennaco said, “in the routine conduct, when an officer comes up to a civilian, and the civilian at the end of that contact believes that the officer did not behave professionally in one way or another, the body camera will tell you what happened. Because there's no obstruction, there's no physicality, it's all there. And you can use that information once you have it to persuasively get a department to take remedial action if remedial action is called for in those kinds of cases.”

Because the biasing effect is real, however, any BWC program must be designed to minimize those biasing effects as much as possible. That is why the Committee's Model Policy requires cameras with a wide angle of view—180 degrees if possible—to capture as much of the scene as possible, including the officer's own arms and legs and other officers on the scene. That is why the Committee recommends that cameras be worn on the body as high as possible, but in no event lower than shoulder level, to minimize the camera angle making civilians look larger

¹⁰¹ Jones, K.A., Crozier, W.E., & Strange, D. (2019). Look there! The effect of perspective, attention, and instructions on how people understand recorded police encounter. *Behav Sci Law*, 37:711–731.

¹⁰² *Id.*

and more menacing than they are. It is why the Committee’s policy requires the use of image stabilization software, to the extent feasible, to reduce the exaggerated sense of chaos and danger that otherwise can arise from the officer’s body movements. It is also why the Committee’s policy requires that all officers on the scene engage their cameras, and that the Department accept civilian or third-party videos on the same basis as BWC footage, to capture the incidents from as many perspectives as possible, and not just from the perspective of one officer focused on a subject, or worse, attempting to manipulate the recording to twist reality. In most cases, these measures probably will not fully address these perceptual biases, but they can at least reduce them to some degree. Similarly, the Committee is recommending that viewers of MPD BWC video be formally informed of the most important perceptual distortions associated with BWC video and instructed to attempt to compensate for them. The research literature is mixed on the efficacy of such instruction (it is notoriously difficult to get people to successfully compensate for cognitive biases), but there is evidence of a degree of mitigation from such instructions in similar contexts.¹⁰³

- **Increased violence by civilians against officers**

At least one global multi-site study, involving well-designed randomized controlled trials across ten sites in eight cities, found that the presence of BWCs increased the rate of assaults against officers (assaults against officers were 14% higher when cameras were present).¹⁰⁴ Importantly, however, the results were heterogeneous across sites—meaning the increase in assaults was observed in some locations but not others—and the reason for this variation was not clear. A follow-up analysis of the data provided some explanations, and pointed to differences in policies governing the use of cameras.¹⁰⁵ Especially given that little if any other research suggests that cameras increase violence by civilians, the Committee hopes that the full package of policies and reforms in Madison will ameliorate any such effect.

- **Increased officer burnout**

There is evidence that BWCs might increase officer burnout. A study of 271 officers across five police departments found that officers wearing BWCs reported higher levels of burnout compared to those who did not, and this difference was highly statistically significant.¹⁰⁶ Body-worn cameras can be seen as a form of electronic performance monitoring of officers, and studies on other forms of electronic performance monitoring have consistently shown increased

¹⁰³ Elek, J. K., Ware, L. J., & Ratcliff, J. J. (2012). Knowing when the camera lies: Judicial instructions mitigate the camera perspective bias. *Legal and Criminological Psychology*, 17(1), 123-135.

¹⁰⁴ Ariel, B. et al. (2016). Wearing body cameras increases assaults against officers and does not reduce police use of force: Results from a global multi-site experiment. *European Journal of Criminology* 13(6), 744-755.

¹⁰⁵ Ariel, B. et al. (2016). Increases in Police Use of Force in the Presence of Body-Worn Cameras are Driven by Officer Discretion: A Protocol-Based Subgroup Analysis of Ten Randomized Experiments, *Eur. J. Criminology* 12:453-463, 459.

¹⁰⁶ Adams, I. & Mastracci, S. (2018). Police Body-Worn Cameras: Effects on Officers’ Burnout and Perceived Organizational Support. *Police Quarterly*, 22(1), 5-30.

burnout and stress, and a decrease in perceived organizational support. In addition, the results of this study are congruent with anecdotal reports from other BWC trials and ethnographic studies. For example, a BWC pilot program in Worcester noted “Officer morale—Officers in the pilot program felt less able to use their discretion at times. They thought that cameras caused them to become more “robotic” and less able to joke around and have fun while doing their jobs. Some officers felt pressure to maintain the demeanor of someone testifying in court. This has the potential to hurt officers’ enjoyment of their jobs, and to reduce community engagement.”¹⁰⁷

- **Decreased civilian complaints**

A potential reduction in civilian complaints against officers is both a potential “pro” and a potential “con.” The “con” arises if BWCs discourage residents from making valid complaints against officers. As noted above, the research confirms that BWCs generally reduce civilian complaints, but it is not clear why. Lum et al (2019) note “officers may be informally negotiating complaints by showing potential complainants or supervisors video footage of the encounter, which may discourage citizens from pursuing complaints for reasons unrelated to whether the complaint is legitimate. Goodall (2007) and Koen (2016), for example, observed these types of exchanges.”¹⁰⁸ A potential complainant with whom an officer is reviewing video may feel intimidated and may be discouraged from filing by authoritative assertions from the officer that the video shows no policy violations. Thus, our Model Policy requires that “In-person review will specifically be provided by a representative of the Office of the Independent Monitor rather than by employees of the Madison Police Department.” The Committee has no way of assessing, based on the research, to what extent BWCs reduce valid complaints, invalid complaints, or both.

- **Decreased trust**

Just as it is possible that BWCs might increase trust in police, they might also have the opposite effect, especially if they are perceived as being used as a tool for monitoring of residents. As we heard from Freedom, Inc., and Upturn, some segments of the community will view cameras with suspicion, as another tool for police to use to oppress them. Moreover, researchers have hypothesized that “BWCs also might exacerbate an already challenged relationship between citizens and the police, especially if citizens expect cameras to be used to increase police accountability and transparency, but officers primarily use them to increase the accountability of citizens.”¹⁰⁹ That observation highlights the Committee’s emphasis that BWCs be adopted, if adopted at all, only in conjunction with other measures designed to increase police transparency and accountability and community trust, such as the 177 recommendations made by the Policy and Procedure Ad Hoc Committee. To date, however, we are not aware of any empirical research that shows that BWCs have in practice led to greater distrust.

¹⁰⁷ Worcester Police Department - Body Worn Camera Pilot Program Report. 2020.

¹⁰⁸ Lum, C., Stoltz, M., Koper, C., & Scherer, J.A. (2019). Research on body-worn cameras: What we know, what we need to know. *Criminology & Public Policy*, 18(1), 93-118.

¹⁰⁹ *Id.*

- **Invasion of privacy**

One of the widely recognized threats posed by BWCs is its potential for serious invasion of privacy. Police officers frequently respond to incidents involving people in some of their most private, unflattering, and embarrassing moments—in domestic disputes, while injured or receiving medical care, while recounting a sexual assault, while suffering mental health breakdowns, while in states of undress, and the like. Recording these moments can sometimes infringe on legitimate privacy interests. In this regard, two aspects of BWCs—enhanced transparency and protection of legitimate privacy interests—are inherently in tension. Both interests can be respected, but doing so requires careful attention to providing extensive and uninterrupted recording and wide public access to the recordings when accountability and transparency concerns are at their highest, and limiting or preventing recording or public access when those concerns are less significant and privacy interests are paramount. And all of that must be done in a context in which officer discretion about whether to record or not is circumscribed. Accommodating all of these interests is not easy, but drawing on thoughtful legal literature on the privacy interests at stake, the Committee’s proposed model police makes a serious, and we believe sensible, attempt to prescribe specific rules that accommodate both interests while limiting officer discretion as much as possible.¹¹⁰

- **Abuse of purpose**

Concern exists among some that, as frontline users of the BWC technology, officers might quickly become experts in uses of the cameras and may discover techniques that permit them to misuse the cameras or the footage by, for example, erasing footage if it shows them in an unfavorable light or reveals violations of policy or the law. Without any guardrails in place, police may simply use body camera footage when it benefits them, and block access when it does not. Leaving the footage solely in the hands of police may create a conflict of interest. To avoid this and other abuses of the BWC system, the Committee’s model policy builds in various safeguards to ensure the integrity of the footage and the appropriate uses of the cameras.

A related problem noted in one paper is that, over time, officers will learn how to manipulate the impression generated by recordings. For example, in one case involving BWC recordings, the officer kept yelling “stop resisting” as the officers beat an individual, Derrick Price, lying passively on the ground. The BWC recordings, with the “stop resisting” verbalizations and hectic jostling of the cameras, conveyed strong apparent evidence of resistance. But this impression was entirely erroneous—a CCTV camera also captured the incident, and showed that the individual was not resisting at all.¹¹¹ A jury would have been far more misled by the conjunction of the BWC video and officer reports, compared to officer reports alone (i.e., might have questioned the officer reports, but not when buttressed by the

¹¹⁰ Hartzog, W. (2018). Body cameras and the path to redeem privacy law. *North Carolina Law Review*, 96(5), 1257-1312.

¹¹¹ Yu, H., Bogen, M., Cook, S., Inouye, S., Lewis, T., McNeil, P., Paluch, L., & Yu, C. (November 2017). The Illusion of Accuracy. How Body-Worn Camera Footage Can Distort Evidence. Upturn and The Leadership Conference. Retrieved from <https://www.upturn.org/reports/2017/the-illusion-of-accuracy/>.

convincing BWC video). BWCs can turn police officers into cinematographers, and it is possible for officers to learn to generate misleading verbal narratives during BWC recordings, to capture planted evidence on camera, etc.—and the impact of such misleading video (which appears to directly provide a viewer with the ground truth of what occurred at the scene) is powerful. It is for this reason that the Committee recommends that all officers on the scene activate their cameras and that all bystander footage be accepted because that increases the number of perspectives and minimizes the ability of officers to manipulate the images captured.

- **Resident intimidation**

Some residents may feel fear due to the BWC recording them. This may lead them to act irregularly or drive them to not reach out to the police even when otherwise appropriate out of fear. It is possible that police might use the threat of recording to intimidate residents. While this concern exists, there is no research or empirical data showing that BWCs have had this effect. The only data the Committee has on this are summaries of focus group discussions conducted by Jacquely Boggess in 2015 and the informal survey taken by Greg Markle of Operation Fresh Start. Markle reported that his survey revealed that a substantial majority of at-risk youths surveyed reported that they would be less fearful of and more trusting in police if they wore BWCs. On the other hand, participants in Jacquelyn Boggess' focus groups in 2015 expressed the following concerns:

A significant number of community engagement participants also agreed with city employee concerns that vulnerable people might choose not to call the police because of the cameras. Many individuals in the Latino community sessions expressed concern that the videos could be used by the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency. Some people thought that most incidents that required police support or protection would be an inappropriate place for body-worn video cameras. In every group, open records and privacy were two important concerns, though they did not rise to the top of any individual or group priority list for vulnerable and marginalized communities.

Participants were worried about video evidence in the context of the regulations of other government institutions and agencies such as probation, parole or child welfare might be interested in their movements or activities. In this regard, some respondents suggested that videos should be destroyed or deleted after a reasonable amount of time. People asked, "Are we creating another CCAP [now WCCA- Wisconsin Circuit Court Access] with this?" "How would cameras impact the many people of color on probation or parole?" and "do police tell/remind citizens they are on camera?"¹¹²

The Committee's Report and Model Policy attempt to address some of these concerns by creating some safeguards against use of BWC footage by immigration authorities and by limiting the length of time routine BWC footage will be retained.

¹¹² YWCA and Center for Family Policy and Practice. 2015. "Body-Worn Video for the Madison Police Department: Community Engagement Sessions."

- **Misuse for immigration enforcement**

Madison's immigrant community has expressed concerns that BWC footage might be misused by immigration authorities to gather information for deportation purposes. While this risk is largely beyond local control, the City can minimize the amount of footage available for ICE scrutiny. The Model Policy proposed by the Committee seeks to do this by requiring that all footage, which is not needed as evidence for a criminal prosecution or an investigation into police conduct, along with a few other exceptions, must be deleted after six months. The Model Policy also builds in safeguards that would require the City to reassess its BWC program should it learn that ICE is accessing footage for deportation purposes.

Additionally, many members of Madison's immigrant communities are already experiencing an enormous amount of stress and have expressed concern that BWC footage of domestic conflicts might be misunderstood or taken out of context in ways that will add to their trauma and ultimately make them less willing to call police for assistance.

- **Facial Recognition Technology might be used against residents**

A significant concern about BWCs is that they will facilitate facial recognition technology to monitor individuals and groups. An increasing number of cases of mistaken arrests of Black men due to facial recognition technology have become apparent.¹¹³ The Common Council has recently restricted the use of facial recognition technology, so this issue might now be moot, at least as a matter of policy. Nonetheless, because it is possible that the City's restriction on facial recognition technology might be repealed, the Committee has retained in its Model Policy a provision banning most uses of facial recognition technology.

- **Diminishing effect**

It is possible that, if BWCs have beneficial effects (e.g., on metrics like trust or certain measures of officer behavior) such effects might become less pronounced or reverse over time. For example, a study in Phoenix, Arizona, found that the rate of officer activation of BWCs was highest in the month immediately after officers received cameras.¹¹⁴ The Committee has attempted to prevent this effect in Madison by removing officer discretion as much as possible regarding when the cameras are activated. A study in Milwaukee observed an immediate impact of BWCs on use of force (officers had 15% fewer use of force incidents in the month after receiving a BWC, a statistically significant reduction ($p = .023$)), but then engaged in 2% more use of force incidents for each subsequent month they had a camera (a statistically significant

¹¹³ Kashmir Hill. Dec. 29, 2020. Another Arrest, and Jail Time, Due to a Bad Facial Recognition Match. New York Times.

¹¹⁴ Katz, C. M., Kurtenbach, M., Choate, D. E., & White, M. D. (2015). Phoenix, Arizona, smart policing initiative: Evaluating the impact of police officer body-worn cameras. Bureau of Justice Assistance.

increase ($p = .008$)), thus making the overall impact null.¹¹⁵ Such potential time effects of BWCs have been under-researched and warrant further investigation. Currently, data are not available to support definitive or comprehensive conclusions.

- **Cost**

BWCs involve serious costs, which must be factored into any decision about implementing a BWC system. The Committee is not well-positioned to make the judgments about whether BWCs are worth the cost, because that depends on a balancing of BWC costs against other budgetary demands and priorities, and the Committee has no information about and is not charged with assessing those expansive City budget considerations; those are matters that the Common Council, the Mayor, and the Police Department are much better situated to balance. But what the Committee can do is try to help those decision-makers understand the potential costs of implementing BWCs, so they can appropriately consider whether they are worth the budgetary trade-offs.

While it is surprisingly difficult to get a firm handle on potential costs, the Committee has been able to glean information about potential costs from a variety of sources. BWC program costs include expenses that arise from purchasing the cameras (and replacing them over time), training, maintaining the hardware, and processing, cataloging, redacting (when necessary), managing, and storing the footage. For a pilot project, preliminary estimates from the MPD are that the costs of a North District BWC pilot program could be in excess of \$136,000. More than \$72,000 of that total is for initial equipment acquisitions, which would not have to be incurred in subsequent years.

For a fully implemented BWC program, preliminary MPD estimates are that first-year startup costs would be approximately \$720,000. The \$720,000 startup figure would include purchasing 289 cameras (enough to outfit all patrol units with cameras) and managing their implementation (training, processing, storage, etc.) for \$575,000 plus another \$145,000 for additional equipment, specifically the hardware to permit automatic triggering of the cameras when squad car light bars are activated—an essential part of a successful BWC program, as discussed and recommended elsewhere in this report and Model Policy. MPD estimates, preliminarily, that thereafter annual operating costs might be approximately \$311,000 plus projected maintenance costs of \$65,000 per year, for an annual cost of approximately \$376,000. MPD cautions that these are all just preliminary predictions, based on estimates from its contract with Panasonic (the vendor that currently provides MPD with its dashcams); these estimates are not, however, based a formal RFP process, and hence are just rough estimates. These estimates could vary significantly depending on the vendor selected and the specific features selected. These estimates also do not appear to include camera replacement costs, yet it can be expected that each camera will have a limited lifetime. If the City adopts an electronic file-sharing system to facilitate transfer of digital footage from police to prosecutors and public defenders, that will also impose additional costs (although over the long run the efficiencies of such a system might produce some offsetting cost savings, and the initial costs of such a system might be shared with the District Attorney's Office and the Public Defender's Office).

¹¹⁵ Peterson, B.E. and Lawrence, D.S. (2020). Do the Effects of Police Body-Worn Cameras on Use of Force and Complaints Change Over Time? Results From a Panel Analysis in the Milwaukee Police Department. *Criminal Justice and Behavior*. Published online first.

Also not included in these estimates are additional demands on officer and supervisor time that BWCs might create. In particular, it is likely that patrol officers will be required to spend a portion of each shift uploading, logging, and annotating footage, and supervisors will have to spend some time reviewing footage and supervising footage management. Currently, MPD does not anticipate a need to hire additional patrol or supervisory staff to make up for this increased workload demand. If not, any extra time required of officers will of necessity come at the expense of other activities they might otherwise undertake. MPD also noted—as have other departments—that some of this increased work time will likely be offset by reduced court time later in BWC cases (because the BWC footage is expected to reduce the range and number of litigable issues in cases).

Assessing just how much officer time will be required is very difficult, however. Survey data collected from officers in a few jurisdictions give one insight into the scope of the demands. In sum, the survey data suggests that officers believe they spend on average somewhere in the neighborhood of 39 minutes each shift classifying and/or reviewing video footage from the cameras.¹¹⁶ Supervisors also spend time reviewing video footage. One survey reported that staff sergeants estimated that they spent roughly 25 minutes on average per shift reviewing body-worn camera footage, but that most said it did not require them to take overtime and “[t]hose who did require overtime said they did not claim it or adjusted their shift to accommodate the extra work.”¹¹⁷ Additionally, “investigators estimated roughly that it took 3 to 5 hours a week toward the end of the pilot to review video and confirm what needed redaction; as cases involving body-worn camera video reach court, this time will increase. However, investigators also acknowledged that this longer time spent on case preparation could potentially cut down on the amount of court time required later.”¹¹⁸

Another glimpse into the potential total costs of the system comes from the Milwaukee Police Department. Milwaukee, which has 1110 patrol officers (compared to Madison’s 486 total officers) has a contract with Axon for a five-year camera and storage solution for a total of \$4,351,014. This system includes the added hardware that activates the cameras as soon as the squad lights go on or the officer starts running, or dispatch engages the system remotely. Milwaukee Police also informed the Committee that the costs of storage did not turn out to be as big a problem as they thought it would, as their contract with the vendor includes unlimited cloud storage (currently, Madison, by contrast, stores all dashcam footage on site). But they said the big unexpected impact was the enormous amount of time it takes law enforcement agencies to process public records requests, because they must redact non-disclosable material in the footage. On the other hand, they reported that the redaction process itself turns out to be not that difficult, as the technology has made it pretty easy to do.

In Fitchburg, when the Police Department deployed cameras two years ago, it paid \$875 per camera, plus \$60 each for magnetic uniform mounts, \$225 each for software licenses, \$375 each for a 5-year protection plan (warranty and equipment damages), \$85 each for deployment

¹¹⁶ <https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/media/document/body-worn-camera-pilot-program-audit.pdf>; <https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/media/document/tps-body-worn-camera-pilot-project-evaluation.pdf>.

¹¹⁷ *Id.* p. 45.

¹¹⁸ *Id.* p. 46.

and etching (for marking each unit with the Department's internal asset tag number and entering each the unit into the Panasonic/Arbitrator System), for a total up-front cost of \$1,620 per unit. They purchased 52 units, for a total start-up cost of \$84,240 for equipping all officers. Additionally, the Department spent \$575 for required hardware for each squad car to allow for light-bar activation, viewing on the in-car computer, classifying the video, and charging. They also spend \$57,000 for 60 TB of server storage space, but they have used only about 25% of that space, so that was far more than they needed. Finally, the Department also purchased an 8-Bay Charger, for \$1,549, which connects to the IT network/server for charging and downloading. The Fitchburg Police Department estimated that, in total, it spent approximately \$149,000 to start its BWC program.

Lt. Hartwick from the Fitchburg Police Department, who presented to our Committee and then provided additional cost information subsequently, reported that it is very hard to assess how much time officers spend working with the cameras and footage, but his best estimate was that each officer spends just three to five minutes per shift. Officers almost never look at the BWC footage when writing their reports (except in OWI cases in which they often review dashcam videos to assess suspect performance on sobriety tests). Fitchburg uses a fairly simple video classification system, in which officers are required only to classify the footage from each shift as footage of an arrest or not, and as footage containing evidence or not (in relation to cases referred for prosecution, typically). The officers have the ability to annotate the videos with additional descriptive information, but usually they do not. If Madison were to adopt the policies recommended by this Committee, officer time would likely be greater here than in Fitchburg, because one of the Committee's recommendations is that officers annotate the footage to help prosecutors and public defenders find the relevant portions of the videos. That annotating would be required, however, only for footage that accompanied a case referral for prosecution; routine encounters that did not result in a referral for prosecution would not require such annotation.

Lt. Hartwick also reported that time spent processing footage for sharing with the DA's office, and for responding to Open Records requests, is quite minimal. He said that the DA has now implemented a new file-share program for electronic data transfer, which means that, from the time a file is created or requested to its completion for transfer to the DA's office or an open records request, it probably takes about ten minutes of officer time. He also said that processing Open Records requests has been surprisingly easy. Fitchburg has had fewer than a handful of cases in which they have received open records requests from someone other than a person in the video, so in most cases they don't have to consider redaction at all. He believed that, if there were a major incident, such as an officer-involved shooting, there could be many requests from outside individuals, but he said the software permits the Department to save redacted copies of the footage, so once they redacted the footage for one person they would not have to do any additional processing for subsequent requesters.

Other cities have reported markedly higher costs than these. The Worcester, MA, Police Department, for example, which is very similar in size to MPD (Worcester apparently has 461 officers and Madison has 486), reports that bids from three vendors came in at total costs ranging from \$9.75 million to \$11.05 million over five years.¹¹⁹ Those bids, however, included

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[http://www6.worcesterma.gov/WebLink/PDF/ooo1jljskmpk5qiy01upjnlc/4/20200721ccm%20\(27\).pdf](http://www6.worcesterma.gov/WebLink/PDF/ooo1jljskmpk5qiy01upjnlc/4/20200721ccm%20(27).pdf).

purchasing many more cameras than MPD would purchase (Worcester budgeted for 453 cameras—apparently one for each individual officer—whereas MPD budgeted for 289 cameras—apparently planning for cameras to be shared and used by officers as they came on shift), and Worcester budgeted for purchasing tasers for every officer, while Madison has no need to purchase any tasers. Worcester also budgeted for purchasing cell phones for every officer, while MPD has proposed no cell phone purchases. It is safe to say, then, that whatever the cost in Madison might be, it will likely be lower than the projected costs in Worcester.

The net costs are difficult to assess for other reasons as well. If BWCs reduce complaints or lawsuits against the City, they might offset the cost of cameras to a significant but presently unquantifiable degree. Further, if BWCs are able to provide increased transparency, accountability, and healing, the cost savings in terms of human suffering and enhanced access to justice could be significant, but are entirely unquantifiable.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Madison is embarking on a bold new experiment in police relations, with its new civilian oversight mechanisms and a full agenda of recommended reforms. The question before this Committee, and ultimately the Common Council, Mayor, and MPD, is whether BWCs should be a part of that experiment.

For those who believe that, whatever the potential outcomes of a BWC experiment, the money is better spent elsewhere, the answer is no. For those who believe that the research is clear enough already that BWCs cannot deliver on their promises, regardless of conditions and policies in Madison, then the answer is no. For those who believe that we should not give police another tool, one in particular that can be misused for mass surveillance and oppression, and who do not trust the policies designed to prevent that, then the answer is no.

Alternatively, for those who believe that BWCs might be useful in advancing Madison's reform agenda and facilitating the new civilian oversight mechanisms, the answer might be yes. For those who believe that the social science research, as mixed as it is, suggests at least the possibility that employing BWCs in Madison under the restrictive policies proposed here, and as part of a larger package of reforms, might have more beneficial effects and fewer negative effects here than elsewhere, then the answer might be yes. For those who believe that BWCs may lead to more comprehensive accountability, that was lost in cases as recently as just this past year, then the answer might be yes. For those who believe that the potential for enhanced transparency, accountability, and healing demand giving a tool like BWCs a try, because we cannot afford the costs of not trying, then the answer is yes.

In the end, the Committee was not unanimous in its answer to these questions, and hence in its recommendation on BWCs. But, a majority of the Committee by a 5-1 vote, said yes. The Committee concluded that in Madison's unique police reform environment, and under the carefully crafted policies set forth in this Report and Model Policy, it is worth at least experimenting with BWCs, to assess whether as applied here BWCs can on balance be sufficiently beneficial to justify their cost. The Committee therefore recommends starting with a rigorous pilot project, and then fully assessing the impact of BWCs in practice here in Madison before moving on to full department-wide implementation. But the Committee again reiterates,

this yes vote is conditioned upon implementing the prerequisites and policies set forth in this Report and Model Policy, and upon an independent assessment by the Common Council, Mayor, and MPD that employing BWCs fits within the City's and the MPD's other budget demands and priorities.

Madison Police Officer Body-Worn Camera Policy¹²⁰

1. Purpose
 - a. The primary purpose of this policy is to establish clear procedures regarding the use of body-worn cameras to document incidents involving police officers and the public, while also protecting the privacy rights of all parties who may be recorded and to minimize the misuse of recording capabilities for mass surveillance of individuals or groups.
 - b. This Department authorizes the use of body-worn cameras to record officer interactions with the public; collect evidence of criminal activity; monitor officer performance and compliance with governing laws and Department policies, procedures, and training; and serve as a training tool.
2. Use of Body-Worn Cameras
 - a. Only law enforcement officers with the authority to conduct searches and make arrests shall be permitted to wear a body camera.
 - b. Officers shall use their body-worn camera and all other recording and imaging devices in compliance with the manufacturer's operational guidelines, Department training, and this policy.
 - c. Officers shall determine, at the start of each shift, whether their body-worn camera is working properly and shall bring any problems with the equipment to the attention of their immediate supervisor as soon as practicable.
 - d. The body-worn camera shall be worn in a location and manner that maximizes the camera's ability to capture footage of the officer's activities, including, to the greatest extent possible, the officer's own body (e.g., legs and arms). The body-worn camera shall be worn as high on the officer's body as feasible, but in no case lower than the shoulder level. The body camera shall have as wide a field of view as can be practically achieved (preferably 180 degrees or wider)
 - e. Technology shall be employed, to the extent feasible, to stabilize video images and reduce the distortions caused by shaking and jostling from the officer's body movements, which can otherwise create a misperception of heightened confusion and chaos.
 - f. Body-worn cameras shall be activated immediately, or as soon as practicable, when responding to all calls for service and during all law enforcement encounters and activities involving the general public. To ensure compliance with this requirement, technologies shall be adopted that automatically engage the recording equipment whenever squad car lights are activated, squad car doors are opened, officers are dispatched to an incident by the dispatch center, the camera system detects that an officer is running, or other similar automatic engagement systems offered by the technology. Automatic engagement systems do not

¹²⁰ This Model Policy draws heavily from a model BWC policy proposed by Professor Kami N. Chavis, a law professor at Wake Forest Law School, which she published as part of her article, *Body-Worn Cameras: Exploring the Unintentional Consequences of Technological Advances and Ensuring a Role for Community Consultation*, 51 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW 985 (2016), with supplemental provisions drawn from the Model Policy produced by the ACLU. Our Committee began with those sources and modified and expanded the policy significantly to address the specific concerns the Committee heard about BWCs in Madison.

absolve officers of their responsibility under this policy to ensure that all law enforcement encounters are recorded. Regardless of whether recording systems are engaged automatically by the technology itself, officers shall ensure that they engage the recording system during all law enforcement encounters.

- i. Law enforcement encounters shall include, but are not limited to the following:
 1. Routine calls for service;
 2. Enforcement encounters where there is at least reasonable suspicion the person involved has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a criminal violation consistent with applicable search-and-seizure law;
 3. Any time an officer engages squad car lights or sirens;
 4. All incidents involving the use of force;
 5. When serving a search warrant;
 6. All investigatory stops;
 7. All traffic stops;
 8. When responding to crimes in progress and priority assignments;
 9. When initiating any vehicular or foot pursuit;
 10. When conducting any vehicle or pedestrian investigation or search;
 11. When initiating any arrest or any in-person citation;
 12. When handling a disturbance or crisis-related incident;
 13. When handling a imminently violent protest or demonstration, but only if there is a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is taking place;
 14. When confronted by any individual who is demonstrating behaviors or language consistent with becoming hostile;
 15. When conducting any investigatory interviews of witnesses or suspects, regardless of location, including telephonic interviews;
 16. Situations where recording might enhance the probability of evidence-based prosecutions; and
 17. Situations where the officer, through training and experience, believes recording would serve a proper police purpose (e.g., recording the processing of an uncooperative arrestee).
- g. If multiple officers are involved in any event for which this policy requires activation of the body-worn camera system, all such officers are required to activate their body-worn cameras so that the incident is recorded from as many perspectives as possible.
- h. The body-worn camera system shall employ buffering technology in all instances in which the recording captures a minimum of 30 seconds of activity prior to the engagement of the recording system.
- i. Body-worn cameras shall not be used covertly. Officers wearing a body-worn camera must notify any persons being recorded, as soon as practicable, that they are being recorded by a body-worn camera.
- j. Officers shall not disengage the body-worn camera or otherwise pause or interrupt the recording until the entire incident that requires recording has concluded and the officer has left the scene. In the event of arrest, the incident is concluded only

when the arrestee is transported to the station, or the recording officer leaves the scene and the presence of the arrestee.

- k. Officers must verbally state the justification for any disengagement of their body-worn camera before disengaging the body-worn camera. Additionally, if an incident report is completed, the officer must thoroughly document the justification for disengaging the body-worn camera in the narrative portion of the report.
 - l. In the event an officer fails to record an incident as required by this policy, failure to activate and the reason for such failure to activate must be properly documented in the officer's activity log and immediately reported to the desk officer. Failure to activate the body-worn camera must also appear in the narrative portion of the officer's incident report.
 - m. If for any reason a recording is interrupted, the officer must document the reason for, or factors contributing to, the interruption with the shift supervisor and in the narrative portion of any incident report, as well as on the recording itself, if possible.
 - n. Appropriate disciplinary action shall be taken against any officer who is found to have intentionally and without reasonable justification failed to adhere to the recording or retention requirements contained in this policy, or to have intentionally interfered with a body-worn camera's ability to accurately capture footage. Since such infractions implicate integrity and compromise the validity of video evidence, they shall generally be deemed a violation of integrity. Notice of any violations of this policy and any documentation related to it shall be provided to the Office of the Independent Monitor and Police Civilian Oversight Board.
3. Prohibited Recording
- a. Officers shall not use their body-worn cameras to record any of the following:
 - i. Places where privacy expectations are paramount, such as, but not limited to, hospital emergency rooms, locker rooms, and restrooms, except in the following instances:
 - 1. When all parties visibly or audibly recorded consent to such recording;
 - 2. While conducting an arrest;
 - 3. While executing a search warrant;
 - 4. When all parties visibly or audibly recorded consent to such recording;
 - 5. While conducting an arrest;
 - 6. While executing a search warrant;
 - 7. During the use of any reportable force; or
 - 8. Under any other extraordinary circumstances that are likely to involve confrontations between police and civilians, such as warrantless entry into a home pursuant to exigent circumstances.
 - ii. While on the grounds of any public, private or parochial elementary or secondary school, except when responding to an imminent threat to life or health, or during custodial interrogations of juveniles, or when responding to an otherwise recordable incident involving only individuals known to police to be adults. Any inadvertent filming of juveniles shall be redacted;

- iii. Activity that is unrelated to a response to a call for service or a law enforcement/investigative encounter between an officer and a member of the public;
- iv. Gruesome images, persons nude or exposed, sensitive human areas, but only if the privacy considerations attendant to such images cannot adequately be accommodated by subsequent redaction or pixelation and are so significant that they justify compromising the integrity of the recording by interrupting continuous recording;
- v. Body cameras shall not be used for any intelligence-gathering efforts involving activities in which subjects are engaging in First Amendment protected speech, associations, or religion, such as but not limited to participation in peaceful protests, attendance at religious services or ceremonies, engaging in normal daily social activities that raise no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, or delivering or attending a lecture, presentation, debate, or similar events;
- vi. The decision whether to record or not record an individual under this policy shall not be based on race, color, gender, national origin, sexual orientation, religion, or other protected classification
- vii. When interacting with an apparent crime victim, a law enforcement officer shall, as soon as practicable, ask the apparent crime victim if the apparent crime victim wants the officer to discontinue use of the officer's body camera. If the apparent crime victim responds affirmatively, the law enforcement officer shall immediately discontinue use of the body camera;
- viii. Whenever a victim or witness requests that he or she not be recorded as a condition of cooperation, when the interests of justice require his or her cooperation, and when the request to turn off the recording by the victim or witness him or herself is captured in the recording before the recording equipment is disengaged;
- ix. Conversations among law enforcement personnel that are not participated in by civilians, but only when this is not in conflict with the requirement for continuous recording in 2.j;
- x. Conversations with confidential informants and undercover officers, unless the recording is conducted specifically for the purpose of documenting an operation, drug purchase/sale, or other important information in furtherance of a criminal investigation.
- xi. When interacting with a person seeking to anonymously report a crime or assist in an ongoing law enforcement investigation, a law enforcement officer shall, as soon as practicable, ask the person seeking to remain anonymous if the person seeking to remain anonymous wants the officer to discontinue use of the officer's body camera. When asking such person if they want to discontinue use of the body camera, the officer must also offer the individual the option of continuing the recording with the understanding that the individual's identity will be protected by redaction technology that will pixelate or blur out identifying information. If the person seeking to remain anonymous requests that the recording cease, the

law enforcement officer shall immediately discontinue use of the body camera.

- b. Except when officers are executing a search or arrest warrant, or when exigent circumstances permit officers to enter a home without a warrant, video recording should occur inside a private residence only subject to the following requirements and conditions:
 - i. As soon as possible upon entering a residence, in a manner that is captured on the audio recording, officers shall request permission to video record. If any apparent lawful occupant or resident of the dwelling, other than an apparent aggressor in a domestic violence situation, denies permission, the body-worn camera shall be de-activated, unless, subject to the limitation set forth in 3.a.vii, legitimate law enforcement objectives require recording, such as where important evidence related to the incident will be irretrievably lost unless recording occurs, or the situation between the police and the occupants becomes confrontational or violent.
 - ii. If, at any time, a subject rescinds consent to record while in a residence, officers shall immediately, or as soon as practicable, deactivate their body-worn cameras, unless continued recording is justified or required by some other provision of this policy
 - iii. Should officers continue to record inside a residence despite a subject's refusal to permit recording or a subject's request to discontinue recording, the officers shall document in their written reports, and if possible on the recording itself, the specific law enforcement needs that they relied upon to override the request to stop recording.
 - iv. If recording is made over the objection of individuals in the residence, supervisory staff shall in all such instances promptly review the incident, including the recording, to determine if continued recording was warranted under this policy. If supervisory staff determine that the recording was made in violation of this policy, the recording shall be redacted to remove improperly recorded portions or the recording shall be deleted.
4. Community-Created Cell Phone and Other Video Recordings
- a. For any incident that is subject to recording via police body-worn cameras pursuant to this policy (whether the body-worn cameras were actually activated or not), the Department shall permit members of the public to submit or otherwise upload recordings of the same incident. Such footage shall be treated as if it were also body-worn camera footage, in accordance with all other policies outlined within this document.
5. Officer Viewing of Recordings
- a. No law enforcement officer shall review or receive an accounting of any electronic recording of an incident prior to completing any required initial reports, statements, and interviews regarding the recorded event, unless doing so is necessary, while in the field, to address an immediate threat to life or safety.
 - b. Once any required initial reports, statements, and interviews are completed, involved officers may then view the video file or other electronic recordings of the recorded incident. If, based on their review of the electronic recording(s) the

officers determine that their written reports or statements were inaccurate or incomplete, they may then submit supplemental reports, making the needed corrections and additions, but must note that the corrections or additions were based on their view of the video file; the initial written report or statement itself may not be altered in any way after viewing the recordings.

6. Security of Body-Worn Camera Footage
 - a. Officers are strictly prohibited from sharing any body-worn camera system login information or passwords with any other person.
 - b. Only officers who have successfully completed body-worn camera training and possess valid body-worn camera system log-in credentials are authorized to view body-worn camera footage.
 - c. Accessing, copying, or releasing files for non-law enforcement purposes are strictly prohibited. All access to the body-worn camera system, other than by the Office of the Independent Police Monitor and Police Civilian Oversight Board, must be authorized in writing by the Chief of Police or their designee.
 - d. Accessing, copying, releasing, or sharing body-worn camera footage on/from any computer or device not issued by the Department is strictly prohibited, except as otherwise provided in this Policy. The Department shall retain a noneditable, original version of all body-worn camera footage and shall log any time the footage is viewed, including the length of time it is viewed and by whom.
 - e. The Department shall log any copying or editing of body-worn camera footage.
 - f. Access to the body-worn camera system shall be controlled through a secure location. All access to the body-worn camera system is logged and subject to audit at any time.
 - g. To protect against unauthorized copying or editing, the Department shall employ a data storage system with built-in audit trails.
 - h. Officers are explicitly prohibited from tampering with, editing, or copying footage stored in the body-worn camera system.
7. Retention of Body-Worn Camera Footage:
 - a. Body camera video footage shall be retained by the law enforcement agency that employs the officer whose camera captured the footage, or an authorized agent thereof, for six (6) months from the date it was recorded, after which time such footage shall be permanently deleted.
 - b. Notwithstanding the retention and deletion requirements set forth above:
 - i. Video footage shall be retained for no less than three (3) years if the video footage captures an interaction or event involving:
 1. Any use of force; or
 2. An encounter about which a complaint has been registered by a subject of the video footage or a witness to the incident.
 - c. Body camera video footage shall also be retained for no less than three (3) years if a longer retention period is voluntarily requested by:
 - i. The law enforcement officer whose body camera recorded the video footage, if that officer reasonably asserts the video footage has evidentiary or exculpatory value;

- ii. Any law enforcement officer who is a subject of the video footage, if that officer reasonably asserts the video footage has evidentiary or exculpatory value;
 - iii. Any superior officer of a law enforcement officer whose body camera recorded the video footage or who is a subject of the video footage, if that superior officer reasonably asserts the video footage has evidentiary or exculpatory value;
 - iv. Any law enforcement officer, if the video footage is being retained solely and exclusively for police training purposes;
 - v. Any member of the public who is a subject of the video footage;
 - vi. Any parent or legal guardian of a minor who is a subject of the video footage; or
 - vii. A deceased subject's spouse, next of kin, or legally authorized designee.
8. Release of body-worn camera footage:
- a. All video footage of an interaction or event captured by a body camera, if that interaction or event is identified with reasonable specificity and requested by a member of the public, shall be provided promptly to the person or entity making the request to the extent permitted by and in accordance with the procedures for requesting and providing government records under the Wisconsin Open Records Law.
 - b. Notwithstanding any time periods established for acknowledging and responding to records requests under the Wisconsin Open Records Law, responses to requests for video footage that is subject to a minimum three (3) year retention period pursuant to Department policy, where a subject of the video footage is recorded being killed, shot by a firearm, or grievously injured, shall be prioritized and the requested video footage shall be provided as expeditiously as possible, but in no circumstances later than five (5) days following receipt of the request.
 - c. Body camera video footage may not be withheld from the public on the basis that it is an investigatory record or was compiled for law enforcement purposes where any person under investigation or whose conduct is under review is a police officer or other law enforcement employee and the video footage relates to that person's on-the-job conduct.
 - d. All unedited footage shall be made available to the Independent Police Monitor (IM) and/or the Police Civilian Oversight Board (COB) promptly upon request.
 - e. When referring a case to the District Attorney's Office for charging, all video footage taken or received by the Madison Police Department related to the incident shall be forwarded to the District Attorney along with the referral documents, or as soon as practicable thereafter.
 - f. Once any individual has been charged with a crime in connection with incidents captured on any body-worn camera footage, the Department shall immediately forward a copy of all such footage to the individual's defense attorney, if any, or to the Madison Trial Office of the State Public Defender's Office, or to the subject individual if the individual expresses an intention to proceed without counsel and requests a copy. Any footage disclosed to the accused and/or counsel must be unabridged and unedited, except to the extent that pixilation or redaction or deletion is otherwise permitted by this policy prior to release to the public, and

in any event only to the extent that such pixilation or redaction does not undermine or detract from the evidentiary value of the recording or obscure any potentially exculpatory information.

- g. When forwarding video footage to the District Attorney's Office and/or Public Defender's Office (or other counsel for the accused in the case, or the accused himself or herself if unrepresented, as set forth above), the Department shall forward with the video footage a report stating in writing where in the video footage (by date, time, or similar reference marking) the events of most relevance to the charges or defenses in the case can be located.
 - h. Any member of the public, parent or guardian of a minor, or next of kin of a deceased, who is a subject of body-worn camera footage, shall be permitted to review an unedited version of that specific footage. If that person is represented by counsel, that attorney shall also be permitted to review an unedited version of that footage. In-person review will specifically be provided by a representative of the Office of the Independent Monitor rather than by employees of the Madison Police Department.
9. Deletion, Editing, or Redaction of Video Footage:
- a. Whenever doing so is necessary to protect personal privacy, the right to a fair trial, the identity of a confidential source or crime victim, or the life or physical safety of any person appearing in video footage, redaction technology may be used to obscure the face and other personally identifying characteristics of that person, including the tone of the person's voice, provided the redaction does not interfere with a viewer's ability to fully, completely, and accurately comprehend the events captured on the video footage.
 - b. In the event of an unintentional activation of a body-worn camera during a nonenforcement or non-investigative activity, including but not limited to, restroom breaks, meal breaks, or other situations where a reasonable expectation of privacy exists, the officer may request the recording be permanently deleted. A memorandum detailing the circumstances of the unintentional recording will be forwarded via the chain of command to the Chief of Police or his or her designee. If approved, the actual deletion requires two-party authorization. One of these parties will be the Chief of Police or his or her designee and the other party will be the Captain of Specialized Services. The following subsection c is inapplicable to deletions made under this section.
 - c. When redaction is performed on video footage, an unedited, original version of the video footage shall be retained.
 - d. Except pursuant to the rules for the redaction of video footage set forth above or where it is otherwise expressly authorized by this Policy, no other editing or alteration of video footage, including a reduction of the video footage's resolution, shall be permitted.
10. Limit on the Use of Biometric Techniques to Search Footage:
- a. The Madison Police Department shall strictly abide by MGO 23.63 and 23.64 restricting facial recognition software.
 - b. Images from body-worn camera footage shall not be used to create a database of mug shots or used as fillers in photograph arrays and shall not otherwise be used except for those purposes expressly permitted under MGO 23.63 and 23.64.

- c. If good cause arises to believe that body-worn camera footage is being used by any governmental agency or entity, federal or state, for a purpose that is impermissible under this policy, such as ICE issuance of administrative subpoenas to utilize facial recognition software to search for undocumented residents, the Chief of Police or the Independent Police Monitor or the Police Civilian Oversight Board should promptly notify the Council of this use and request a prompt decision by the Council as to whether to continue or end the body-worn camera program.

11. Training Requirements

- a. All officers and supervisors will be provided adequate training in the use of body-worn cameras prior to using the equipment. Annual retraining will be provided to all authorized users of the body-worn cameras.

12. Discipline for Violations.

- a. Should any law enforcement officer, employee, or agent fail to adhere to the recording or retention requirements contained in this policy, intentionally interfere with a body camera's ability to accurately capture video footage, or otherwise manipulate the video footage captured by a body camera during or after its operation appropriate disciplinary action shall be taken against the individual officer, employee or agent.
- b. Supervisory staff shall periodically review body-worn camera footage for evaluation of officer performance and training purposes. No officer, however, may be disciplined or reprimanded for failing to issue a citation or make an arrest, in circumstances where supervisor review of footage alerted the supervisory staff to facts suggesting that grounds for citation or arrest were present in an encounter. The Department shall broadly publicize to officers, through training and periodic updates, that no officer will be subject to discipline or reprimand for failure to make an arrest or issue a citation in circumstances where body camera footage suggests there were grounds for citation or arrest.

13. Data Collection and Reporting

- a. Comprehensive data shall be maintained by the Department on its Body-Worn Camera Program. The collected data shall include, but need not be limited to:
 - i. The number of officers equipped with body-worn cameras;
 - ii. The number of times per officer per shift that body-worn cameras are engaged;
 - iii. The nature of the encounters that are recorded (e.g., Arrests, citations, execution of search warrants);
 - iv. Topics identified during supervisor review of body-worn camera footage for purposes of training accompanied by descriptive data on the uses of this footage in individual or department-wide training;
 - v. The duration of the recorded encounters;
 - vi. The number and nature of use-of-force incidents captured by body-worn cameras;
 - vii. The number and percentage of times that victims, witnesses, or residents request that the cameras be turned off;
 - viii. The number and nature of body-worn camera policy violations by officers;
 - ix. The number and nature of technical malfunctions;

- x. The quantity of stored recording footage and associated costs;
 - xi. The outcomes of incidents captured on video, including whether an individual was charged with a crime, the nature of any such charges, the number of times an officer was the subject of a complaint or discipline from incidents with body-worn camera footage and the nature of the alleged violations and the outcomes.
 - xii. The number of times that initial police-officer reports or charging recommendations are altered after officer or supervisor review of body-worn camera footage, and if charges are altered, the nature of the changes.
 - xiii. The race of subjects captured on body-worn camera footage.
 - xiv. The frequency of body-worn camera engagements by geographical area within the city.
 - xv. Other things?
- b. The data collected by this section shall be provided to the Independent Monitor and Civilian Oversight Board on at least an annual basis, or at an earlier interval upon request of either the Independent Monitor or the Civilian Oversight Board. This report shall also include metrics on aspects of impact, such as criminalization rates, charging decisions, and uses of force.